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MARKET  POWER  WITHOUT  MARKET  DEFINITION
Daniel A. Crane*
ABSTRACT
Antitrust law has traditionally required proof of market power in most cases and has ana-
lyzed market power through a market definition/market share lens.  In recent years, this indirect
or structural approach to proving market power has come under attack as misguided in practice
and intellectually incoherent.  If market definition collapses in the courts and antitrust agencies,
as it seems poised to do, this will rupture antitrust analysis and create urgent pressures for an
alternative approach to proving market power through direct evidence.  None of the leading theo-
retic approaches—such as the Lerner Index or a search for supracompetitive profits—provides a
robust solution.  Further, one of the core premises in modern antitrust analysis—that the presence
of high entry barriers is necessary to market power—is deeply flawed.  Counterintuitively, the
higher the entry barriers, the less likely it is that (1) the accused firm engaged in anticompetitive
conduct and (2) the market would have been more competitive but for the alleged conduct.  A
robust approach to market power would require a tight nexus between the challenged conduct and
a plausible competitive counterfactual.  This Article articulates first principles of market power,
diagnoses sources of confusion in the current caselaw, and scrutinizes the recognized methods of
proving market power without reliance on market definition and market shares.
INTRODUCTION
Market power is an indispensable element in all antitrust cases except
for those arising under the Sherman Act’s rule of per se illegality.1  Merger,
monopolization, and rule of reason cases—the bulk of antitrust—require
proof of market power to establish liability.2  A showing of defendant market
© 2014 Daniel A. Crane.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so
long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Associate Dean for Faculty and Research and Frederick Paul Furth, Sr. Professor of
Law, University of Michigan.
1 2B PHILLIP E. AREEDA ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 500, at 107 (3d ed. 2007) (describing
the importance of the market power requirement in antitrust cases).
2 See Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886 (2007)
(describing the rule of reason as “an inquiry into market power and market structure
designed to assess [a restraint’s] actual effect” (alteration in original) (quoting Cop-
perweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984)) (internal quotation
marks omitted)); United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966) (describing
possession of monopoly power as an indispensable element in monopolization cases under
section 2 of the Sherman Act); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL
MERGER GUIDELINES § 1, at 2 (2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guide
31
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power has long been a “screen” through which plaintiffs must pass before
advancing the merits of their complaint.3  Traditionally, courts have required
plaintiffs to prove market power by showing the defendant’s share of a prop-
erly defined relevant market and then examining other structural factors
such as entry barriers, demand elasticity, pricing transparency, and customer
strength.4  Market definition has been the necessary first step in this analysis
and, because of its technical difficulty, a breaking point for many antitrust
complaints.5
In recent years, however, traditional market definition has come under
severe attack in the legal academy and in the antitrust agencies.  In 2010, the
Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) drastically
revised their Horizontal Merger Guidelines (Horizontal Merger Guidelines
or Guidelines) and demoted market definition from the critical starting
point to merely one available tool in merger cases.6  Afterwards, Louis
Kaplow, one of the most widely respected theorists of antitrust, published an
article in the Harvard Law Review essentially calling the entire enterprise of
market definition intellectually bankrupt and questioning whether market
definition should ever be required.7  Shortly thereafter, Herbert
Hovenkamp, another highly respected antitrust academic and the senior
author of the extraordinarily influential Areeda Antitrust Law treatise,8 pub-
lines/hmg-2010.html [hereinafter HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES] (“The unifying
theme of these Guidelines is that mergers should not be permitted to create, enhance, or
entrench market power or to facilitate its exercise.”).
3 Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 17–18 (1984) (pro-
posing market power screens in antitrust litigation).
4 2B AREEDA ET AL., supra note 1, at 107–34 (describing methods of proving market
power based on a market definition approach).
5 See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker, Market Definition: An Analytical Overview, 74 ANTITRUST
L.J. 129, 129 (2007) (“Throughout the history of U.S. antitrust litigation, the outcome of
more cases has surely turned on market definition than on any other substantive issue.”);
Howard A. Shelanski, Antitrust Law as Mass Media Regulation: Can Merger Standards Protect the
Public Interest?, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 371, 415 (2006) (describing market definition as a stum-
bling block in merger cases); Avishalom Tor & William J. Rinner, Behavioral Antitrust: A
New Approach to the Rule of Reason After Leegin, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 805, 860 n.318 (describ-
ing market definition as a stumbling block in rule of reason cases).
6 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 2, § 4, at 7.  On the reduced impor-
tance of market definition in the 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, see Larry Fullerton,
Introduction: 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, ANTITRUST, Fall 2010, at 8.
7 Louis Kaplow, Why (Ever) Define Markets?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 437, 440 (2010) (argu-
ing that the market definition process should be abandoned).
8 On the influence of the Areeda treatise, see Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust Modesty, 105
MICH. L. REV. 1193, 1193 (2007).  Justice Breyer has remarked that “most practitioners
would prefer to have two paragraphs of Areeda’s treatise on their side than three Courts of
Appeals or four Supreme Court Justices.”  Justice Stephen Breyer, In Memoriam: Phillip E.
Areeda, 109 HARV. L. REV. 889, 890 (1996).  In a recent oral argument, Justice Breyer dei-
fied Areeda, although he was uncertain whether Areeda should count as a “major” or
“minor” deity.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 22, Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Actavis, Inc., 133
S. Ct. 2223 (2013) (No. 12-416), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_argu
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\90-1\NDL102.txt unknown Seq: 3  8-DEC-14 14:32
2014] market  power  without  market  definition 33
lished a paper questioning the need to define markets in merger cases.9
Given these and other developments, the handwriting is on the wall for mar-
ket definition.
If market definition falls, so does the entire structure of analysis built on
top of it—which is to say, a whole lot of antitrust law—unless a suitable
replacement can be found.  But there is no clear candidate to take the place
of traditional market definition as an indirect means of proving market
power.  While some caselaw recognizes the theoretical availability of “direct”
approaches to proving market power10 and academic theories abound, the
existing theories and doctrines are a smorgasbord of incompatible and often
incoherent recipes.  Antitrust’s analytical core is crumbling and there is no
clear replacement.
What is more, some of the key conventional understandings of market
power turn out to be misguided.  Most fundamentally, antitrust law has gen-
erally conceived of market power in an absolute sense by comparing the
actual market to some textbook ideal market, without regard to whether the
market in question could possibly resemble the ideal market given its eco-
nomic properties.  But market power only makes sense as an expression, in
relative terms, of the distance between the market as it is and a competitive
counterfactual—the market as it reasonably could be absent anticompetitive
conduct.  Since antitrust policy aims to reduce the delta between a plausible
competitive counterfactual and the actual circumstances, market power
should be understood as that delta—the infirmity that antitrust law could
correct.
As a result of this grounding misconception, antitrust law has made
assumptions about market power that are imprecise, overstated, and poten-
tially misleading.  Two are particularly important.  First, conventional wisdom
holds that the higher the barriers to market entry, the more likely that the
firms in the market have engaged in anticompetitive conduct.11  But the rela-
tionship between entry barriers and the competitive counterfactual is not
ments/argument_transcripts/12-416.pdf (“I mean, Professor Areeda, who is at least in my
mind a minor deity in the matter, in this area, if not major, he explains it.”).
9 Herbert Hovenkamp, Markets in Merger Analysis, 57 ANTITRUST BULL. 887 (2012),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1945964.
10 See infra Section I.C. See generally 2B AREEDA ET AL., supra note 1, at 135–224
(describing indirect methods of proving market power).
11 See, e.g., United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 559 (1973) (Marshall,
J., concurring) (asserting that the dangers of anticompetitive conduct are “especially
intense when the market is already highly concentrated or entry barriers are already
unusually high”); ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254, 285 (3d Cir. 2012)
(affirming a jury verdict for a plaintiff in a monopolization case and observing that the
record showed that entry barriers were “especially high”); Sterling Merch., Inc. v. Nestle´,
S.A., 656 F.3d 112, 125 (1st Cir. 2011) (rejecting plaintiff’s claim that high entry barriers
facilitated defendant’s allegedly anticompetitive scheme based on finding that there have
been other successful new entrants into the market); Ball Mem’l Hosp., Inc. v. Mut. Hosp.
Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1335 (7th Cir. 1986) (noting that “the lower the barriers to entry,
and the shorter the lags of new entry, the less power existing firms have”).
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always linear.  As structural entry barriers become higher, the firms in the
market have reduced incentives to expend capital to exclude rivals since it is
decreasingly likely that rivals will be able to enter even absent exclusionary
conduct.  Hence, the generic probability that firms have engaged in anticom-
petitive conduct decreases as entry barriers become higher.  Similarly, as
entry barriers become higher, it is decreasingly likely that there is a competi-
tive counterfactual—a but-for world in which the market is more competitive.
Hence, the kind of market power that should be most concerning in exclu-
sion cases is the middling power that arises from markets where entry barri-
ers are surmountable absent anticompetitive conduct.  Markets with very
high entry barriers—the focus of current market power principles—should
be of less interest to antitrust policy on exclusion.
Second, relationships between revenues and costs are only weakly corre-
lated with the normative functions that the market power inquiry is supposed
to serve.  Thus, for example, the Lerner Index—the leading “direct” measure
of market power—quantifies market power based on the excess of price over
marginal cost since firms should price at marginal cost under conditions of
perfect competition.12  But using perfect competition as the baseline from
which to judge market power in antitrust cases is unworkable since perfect
competition cannot exist in markets with differentiated goods and high fixed
costs13—which is to say, most of the markets where market power is of inter-
est to contemporary antitrust.  Other profitability measures proposed in aca-
demic literature or caselaw are similarly defective.
Beyond entry barriers and profitability margins, extant caselaw and aca-
demic literature propose a number of other criteria to judge market power
directly—that is to say, without resort to market definition and market
shares.  Some of the proposed criteria, such as the presence of price discrimi-
nation or the exclusion of competition, are economically unsound or circu-
lar.  Others, such as diversion ratios, pricing discontinuity, and competitive
benchmarking, may be helpful under some circumstances, but pose consid-
erable risks of error and usually cannot suffice to demonstrate market power
without confirmation by other criteria.  The upshot is that, at present, direct
proof of market power is a basket of broken or incomplete tools.  Even if the
broken tools were discarded, the remaining ones would be unsuitable for
proving market power standing alone or, often, even in combination.  For all
of its perhaps damning faults, the market definition/market share paradigm
prescribed a systematic and deductive approach to proving market power.  Its
demise leaves courts and antitrust agencies groping to analyze market power
issues on an ad hoc and inductive basis.
This Article aims to provide a coherent analytical framework for discuss-
ing market power in general and direct proof in particular.  No set of tools
for determining the existence of market power, whether directly or other-
12 Abba P. Lerner, The Concept of Monopoly and the Measurement of Monopoly Power, 1 REV.
ECON. STUD. 157, 161 (1934); see also William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power
in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REV. 937, 939 (1981).
13 See infra text accompanying notes 148–57.
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wise, will be effective unless it begins with analytically sound first principles
about how the market power inquiry serves antitrust law’s normative aspira-
tions.  Thus, Part I of this Article provides grounding principles for inquiries
into market power.  In particular, it introduces the key concept of the com-
petitive counterfactual, which reorients antitrust law from its current assump-
tions about perfectly competitive markets toward a more realistic appraisal of
plausible competitive scenarios given inherent market features.  It also briefly
summarizes the infirmities of the “indirect” market definition based
approach and the current confusion in the caselaw on direct proof of market
power.
Part II critically evaluates the leading contenders for proving market
power directly.  Some of them, like using profitability margins, the existence
of price discrimination, or proof of exclusion of competition, are misguided
and should be discarded altogether.  Others, like entry barriers, diversion
ratios, pricing discontinuity, and competitive benchmarks may be helpful in
some cases, although only with awareness of the many potential pitfalls.
What emerges after the brush clearing is that current caselaw and academic
theory have not yet provided a robust and comprehensive approach to prov-
ing market power and that antitrust law will be largely starting from scratch,
with a few scattered and incomplete tools, if it moves away from the market
definition/market share paradigm.
Part III concludes with four case studies illustrating how a reexamination
of first principles of market power could improve antitrust analysis even given
the current incomplete toolkit.  It considers the analysis of market power in
four technology-intensive markets—computer operating systems, Internet
search engines, e-books, and pharmaceuticals—and suggests how conven-
tional wisdom on market power might lead to misleading results in those
cases.
I. GROUNDING PRINCIPLES
A. First Principles: The Competitive Counterfactual
Today there is a wide consensus that the primary, if not exclusive, goal of
antitrust law is to promote economic efficiency and consumer welfare by
deterring firms from subverting the competitive process and thus deriving
the power to reduce output, price above competitive levels, and stymie inno-
vation.14  Apart from per se offenses where market power is assumed as a rule
of judicial convenience,15 antitrust claims16 reduce to two fundamental ele-
14 The Supreme Court has repeatedly referred to the antitrust laws as “a consumer
welfare prescription.”  NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 107 (1984) (quoting Reiter v.
Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
15 See FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 430–31 (1990) (hold-
ing that lack of market power is not a defense in a per se case); Bus. Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp
Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 744 n.7 (1988) (“There is no doubt that horizontal intrabrand
price fixing is per se illegal, even if the conspirators lack the market power to affect inter-
brand competition in a manner that would violate the rule of reason.”); Arizona v. Mari-
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ments: (1) the actual presence or dangerous likelihood of market power; and
(2) anticompetitive conduct creating, retaining, or enlarging that market
power.  This is most obvious in the two-part definition of monopolization
under section 2 of the Sherman Act,17 but is also apparent in multi-factored
rule of reason analysis, which ultimately reduces to proof that the defendant
has market power and has obtained it through agreements not reasonably
necessary to secure efficiencies.18
Before elaborating further on the market power element, a word on two
possible objections to this reductionism.  First, in challenges to unconsum-
mated mergers (which is most merger challenges)19 and in attempted
monopolization cases,20 actual market power is not an ingredient of the case
since, by definition, the merging firms have not yet obtained the prohibited
power and the would-be monopolist has been thwarted.  But that is not a
serious objection to my analytical reduction since proof of probabilistic mar-
ket power remains an element in both cases.  Mergers are prohibited if they
are likely to result in market power,21 and attempted monopolization
requires a showing of dangerous probability that the defendant would
achieve market power.22  Thus, with the qualification that probabilistic
copa Cnty. Med. Soc’y, 457 U.S. 332, 354 (1982) (explaining that the rule of reason is
grounded in “economic prediction, judicial convenience, and business certainty” as well as
“a recognition of the respective roles of the Judiciary and the Congress in regulating the
economy” (citing United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 611–12 (1972))).
16 The original construction of the Robinson-Patman Act is a possible exception to this
statement, but more recent precedents have required market power in both primary and
secondary line cases. See Volvo Trucks N. Am., Inc. v. Reeder-Simco GMC, Inc., 546 U.S.
164, 181 (2006) (rejecting a secondary line price discrimination claim in part because of
the lack of evidence that any favored purchaser possessed market power); Brooke Grp. Ltd.
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 225 (1993) (requiring evidence of
market power in a primary line price discrimination case).
17 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570–71 (1966) (“The offense of
monopoly under § 2 of the Sherman Act has two elements: (1) the possession of monopoly
power in the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power
as distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product,
business acumen, or historic accident.”).
18 Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877, 886 (2007) (noting
that the rule of reason can be equated with “an inquiry into market power and market
structure designed to assess [a restraint’s] actual effect” (alteration in original) (quoting
Copperweld Corp. v.  Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 768 (1984) (internal quota-
tion marks omitted))).
19 See Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust Antifederalism, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 54 (2008) (describ-
ing the process of merger review under Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of
1976).
20 Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 455 (1993) (stating that since
1905 the Court’s decisions “have reflected the view that the plaintiff charging attempted
monopolization must prove a dangerous probability of actual monopolization”).
21 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 2, § 1, at 2 (stating that mergers are
prohibited if they would “create, enhance, or entrench market power or . . . facilitate its
exercise”).
22 Spectrum Sports, 506 U.S. at 455.
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rather than actual market power is one of the two core ingredients in some
cases, the reduction stands.
Second, there is an open question under U.S. antitrust law whether pure
exploitation of market power, without creation, retention, or expansion of
that power, violates any of the antitrust laws.23  Thus, for example, if a tying
arrangement harms the interests of consumers by enabling price discrimina-
tion but results in no increase in the defendant’s market power, some com-
mentators believe that antitrust law does or should provide a remedy.24
Although other legal systems, such as the European Union, condemn the
exploitation or abuse of market power without any proof of creation, reten-
tion, or enlargement,25 it is doubtful that this view holds under current U.S.
law.26  If it does, then the meaning of market power for pure exploitation
purposes is outside the purview of this Article.
Returning now to the ordinary market power element, market power is
usually defined as the power to raise prices above competitive levels or
exclude competitors.27  Market power thus entails an implicit reference to an
undefined alternative state in which the market functions more competi-
tively—what I will call the competitive counterfactual.  The degree of market
power of interest to antitrust law is the delta between the actual or probabilis-
tic position of the accused firm and the competitive counterfactual.  Hence,
23 See generally Daniel Crane, Tying and Consumer Harm, 8 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 27
(2012) (arguing that some theory of anticompetitive effect from a tying arrangement
should be required in every tying case).
24 Einer Elhauge, Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single Monopoly Profit
Theory, 123 HARV. L. REV. 397, 426–50 (2009) (arguing that “power effects” from the
exploitation of market power should be deemed anticompetitive).
25 See ARIEL EZRACHI, EU COMPETITION LAW 165–266 (3d ed. 2012) (discussing how
conduct that may be regarded as abusive may escape prohibition in Article 102 of the
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union and its analysis).
26 See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 14 (1984) (“Thus, the
law draws a distinction between the exploitation of market power by merely enhancing the
price of the tying product, on the one hand, and by attempting to impose restraints on
competition in the market for a tied product, on the other.  When the seller’s power is just
used to maximize its return in the tying product market, where presumably its product
enjoys some justifiable advantage over its competitors, the competitive ideal of the Sher-
man Act is not necessarily compromised.  But if that power is used to impair competition
on the merits in another market, a potentially inferior product may be insulated from
competitive pressures.”); Brantley v. NBC Universal, Inc., 675 F.3d 1192 (9th Cir. 2012)
(affirming dismissal of tying claim based purely on exploitation theory); see also Verizon
Commc’ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004) (“The
mere possession of monopoly power, and the concomitant charging of monopoly prices, is
not only not unlawful; it is an important element of the free-market system.”).
27 United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956).  On the
distinction between raising prices and excluding competitors—or on Stiglerian and Banian
market power, see Thomas G. Krattenmaker et al., Monopoly Power and Market Power in
Antitrust Law, 76 GEO. L.J. 241 (1987).  For purposes of this Article, the legal distinction
between monopoly power and market power is analytically unimportant, since monopoly
power is just a strong form of market power. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 195
(2d ed. 2001).
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market power is normatively relative to an assumed counterfactual in which
markets perform more competitively.
A critically important implication of this observation—largely over-
looked in current legal doctrine—is that market power has no constant refer-
ent but exists only relatively to a plausible competitive counterfactual.
Imagine two firms each with a 30% market share operating in two different
markets with comparable concentration and profitability indexes—say a
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index28 (HHI) of 4000 and a Lerner Index29 of 0.5.
Both firms would be thought to have market power in a generic sense, but
the two firms’ deltas from the competitive counterfactual might be radically
different.  In one case, it might be that the market’s cost structure and other
economic attributes would be conducive to allowing many more firms in the
market and a much lower ratio of prices to marginal costs.  In the other case,
the market might be operating at its competitive optimum given its economic
constraints (such as scale or scope economies and fixed-cost structures).  Say-
ing that both firms possess market power in an abstract sense supplies no
useful information for conducting antitrust analysis.  In one case, an antitrust
challenge makes sense if the firm obtained its position through anticompeti-
tive means.  The firm has deprived consumers and society at large of a better
state of affairs.  In the other, an antitrust challenge does not make sense,
since there is no but-for world in which consumer interests and efficiency are
better served and hence nothing for antitrust law to remedy.
Current legal doctrine largely treats market power as an abstract quality
deduced from market shares, entry barriers, and other structural factors.30  It
holds up as the relevant baseline a model of textbook competition in which
entry and exit are easy, prices approximate marginal cost, and innovation is
constant and costless.  It thus misses its own normative foundation—that anti-
trust law exists to prevent deviations from a superior competitive state that
could actually obtain given technological, economic, and social constraints.
To be consistent with this norm, antitrust law would need to direct analysis to
the relationship between the competitive counterfactual and the actual con-
dition—to measure deltas rather than absolute conditions.  The competitive
counterfactual would need to be assessed given case-specific economic reali-
ties rather than textbook assumptions.
There is one important exception to the foregoing critique of conven-
tional market power measurement: the structuralist approach to horizontal
merger review, especially that which prevailed under the Horizontal Merger
28 The HHI is a measure of market concentration that requires summing the squares
of the individual market participants to arrive at an overall market concentration ratio. See
HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 2, § 5.3, at 18; see also Neil B. Cohen &
Charles A. Sullivan, The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index and the New Antitrust Merger Guidelines:
Concentrating on Concentration, 62 TEX. L. REV. 453, 459–60 (1983).
29 See supra text accompanying note 12.
30 See 2B AREEDA ET AL., supra note 1, ¶ 501, at 109.
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Guidelines in place between 1992 and 2010,31 correctly conceived of the
market power relevant to antitrust analysis as the delta between the pre-
merger market condition and the post-merger condition.  The Guidelines
began with current, pre-merger prices and asked whether the merger would
facilitate an increase in prices over existing levels.32  For this, leading com-
mentators accused the Guidelines of committing the “cellophane fallacy”33
(discussed in the next Part)—failing to recognize that existing market prices
might already reflect the exercise of market power.34  That criticism was off
the mark.  The normative function of merger review is to ensure that merg-
ers do not create new market power,35 not to measure the market’s deviation
from some theoretical norm of perfect competition.  If the pre-merger mar-
ket already exhibits market power, this is no objection to a merger that does
not enhance the preexisting power since the merger makes things no worse
than they already are.  Hence, the existing market condition is the competi-
tive counterfactual against which post-merger effects need to be measured—
which is what the Guidelines tried to do.
The Guidelines’ problem was not that they committed the cellophane
fallacy, but that their formal tools of structural analysis—particularly market
definition, the computation of market shares, and inferences from concen-
tration indexes—could easily result in arbitrary predictions about a merger’s
likely competitive effects.36  Thus, as discussed in the next Part, the 2010
Guidelines revisions severely demoted structural or “indirect” analysis and
moved merger review toward a “direct” evidence approach.  This may have
alleviated a measurement problem, but it also aggravated the separate analyt-
ical problem of relating market power to a competitive counterfactual.
As discussed further below, antitrust law’s general failure to recognize
market power as relative rather than absolute will not be easily solved with a
transition from indirect to direct modes of proof.  It continues to show up in
many potential approaches to direct proof of market power as well.  In transi-
tioning away from conventional market definition, a reexamination of first
principles is sorely needed.
31 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES
(rev. ed. 1997), available at http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/merger-
review/hmg.pdf.
32 Id. § 1.11.
33 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY § 3.4b, at 106 (3d ed. 2005) (“The
1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines also commit a version of the Cellophane fallacy by
defining markets in terms of current prices.”); Krattenmaker et al., supra note 27, at 256
n.75 (explaining that a necessary finding of market power as a prerequisite to an antitrust
violation, thus leading to a firm’s exclusionary conduct being immunized, leads to the
faulty approach known as the “Cellophane fallacy”).
34 See infra text accompanying notes 42–52.
35 United States v. Cont’l Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 463–64 (1964) (explaining concern
in merger cases over enhancement of market power).
36 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 33; Kaplow, supra note 7.
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B. The Infirmities of Market Definition
Criticisms of the “indirect” market definition/market share approach to
proving market power abound,37 and it is not my purpose in this Article to
pile on.  This Part briefly introduces the leading existing methods of market
definition and their flaws as background to an exploration of direct means of
proving market power and their relationship to the competitive
counterfactual.
The Supreme Court has held that the starting point for determining the
existence of market power is the identification of a relevant market consist-
ing of the “commodities reasonably interchangeable by consumers for the
same purposes.”38  The leading Supreme Court cases recognize two, often
conflicting, approaches to determining whether consumers view goods as
reasonably substitutable.  Both methods are highly problematic.
First, a relevant market may be defined through economic data showing
how consumers react to changes in the price of goods or services—the previ-
ously mentioned cellophane approach.  In United States v. E.I. du Pont de
Nemours & Co. (E.I. du Pont or the “cellophane case”), the question was
whether the relevant market should be considered just cellophane, in which
event E.I. du Pont would have a monopoly, or whether there was a wider
market including other flexible packaging materials like Pliofilm, glassine,
foil, polyethylene, waxed paper, and Saran Wrap.39  The Court concluded
that the market included all flexible wrapping materials because there was
evidence of substantial cross-elasticity of demand40 between cellophane and
the other materials.41  As numerous courts and commentators have pointed
out since, the fact that consumers considered cellophane and other flexible
wrapping materials substitutes at prevailing prices did not negate the possibil-
ity that E.I. du Pont had market power over cellophane.42  If E.I. du Pont had
37 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 33; Kaplow, supra note 7; see also Dennis W. Carlton,
Market Definition: Use and Abuse, 3 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 3 (2007), available at http://
ssrn.com/abstract=987061 (arguing that whether market power exists is “problematic to
answer by using market definition”); Mark R. Patterson, The Market Power Requirement in
Antitrust Rule of Reason Cases: A Rhetorical History, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 8–9 (2000)
(explaining that the Supreme Court established that “a showing of market power was not
necessary when anticompetitive effects had been shown”).  For more optimistic treatment
of market definition, see Baker, supra note 5; Malcolm B. Coate & Joseph J. Simons, In
Defense of Market Definition, 57 ANTITRUST BULL. 667 (2012).
38 United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 395 (1965).
39 Id. at 380.
40 Cross-elasticity of demand refers to the increase in demand for one product caused
by an increase in the price of another.  F.M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET
STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 75 n.55 (3d ed. 1990).
41 E.I. du Pont, 351 U.S. at 400.
42 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, MARKET POWER HANDBOOK 59–60 (2005); 2B
AREEDA, supra note 1, ¶ 539; RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 128 (1976); Baker, supra
note 5, at 162–65; Robert Pitofsky, New Definitions of Relevant Market and the Assault on Anti-
trust, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1805, 1814 (1990); Lawrence J. White, Market Power and Market
Definition in Monopolization Cases, in 2 ISSUES IN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 913 (2008);
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monopolized the cellophane market and then raised the price of cellophane
to the profit-maximizing monopoly level, other flexible wrapping materials
would become good substitutes for cellophane at the monopoly price.
Unless the pricing data can be gleaned from a period as to which the con-
duct under consideration could have had no effect (as is true in prospective
merger cases),43 the cross-elasticity approach may systematically result in
false negatives.
The other leading approach, reflected in United States v. Grinnell Corp.,44
is to identify markets based on the idiosyncratic preferences of discrete
groups of customers.  Grinnell and its affiliated companies provided accred-
ited central service station services such as fire and burglary protection.45
These services involved the installation of a hazard-detecting device at the
customer’s place of business with a direct link to a central service station that
could notify the police or fire department in case of an alarm.46  The key
issue was whether accredited central service station services were in a distinct
product market from other forms of fire and burglary protection, including
unaccredited services and other self-help forms of protection.47  The evi-
dence showed that at least some customers valued accreditation highly
because it resulted in a reduction in their property insurance premiums.48
The Court conceded that some customers did not care about the insurance
premium reduction and would gladly substitute to a cheaper, unaccredited
service.49  But, to the Court, this was not a sufficient reason to find that the
relevant market included unaccredited services, since other customers had
an idiosyncratic preference for accreditation.50  Finding that a subpopulation
of buyers did not consider accredited and unaccredited services reasonably
interchangeable, the Court found accredited services a separate relevant
market.
The Grinnell approach marks little analytic improvement over E.I. du
Pont.  Simply knowing that certain customers consider the products sold by a
particular firm unique does not prove that the seller has any pricing power
over them.  Unless the idiosyncratic buyers are a large group, then even if the
seller is aware of their preferences it will not increase the general market
price in an effort to exploit them, since then it will lose too many sales to
Gene C. Schaerr, Note, The Cellophane Fallacy and the Justice Department’s Guidelines for
Horizontal Mergers, 94 YALE L.J. 670 (1985).
43 See supra text accompanying notes 168–71.
44 384 U.S. 563 (1966).
45 Id. at 566–68.
46 Id. at 566–67.
47 Id. at 570–71.
48 Id. at 574.
49 Id. (noting that “[t]hough some customers may be willing to accept higher insur-
ance rates in favor of cheaper forms of protection, others will not be willing or able to risk
serious interruption to their businesses, even though covered by insurance , and will thus
be unwilling to consider anything but central station protection”).
50 Id.
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other buyers.51  The seller may try to price discriminate to the idiosyncratic
group, but unless it can identify them and prevent arbitrage from undermin-
ing its effort,52 then price discrimination will not be possible and the idiosyn-
cratic buyers will pay the lower, general market price.
The analytical weakness in current caselaw is arguably an artifact of the
cases themselves, but broader conceptual criticisms have also been leveled.
In particular, Kaplow argues that the entire concept of market definition is
misguided.  In a nutshell, Kaplow asserts that the entire construct of market
definition is faulty because one is required to begin with an estimate of cross-
elasticity in a provisional group of products before one can work out toward
defining a relevant market.53  Since the refinements that follow the initial
estimate are derivative of the initial estimate and cannot improve it, Kaplow
argues that the steps subsequent to initial elasticity estimation can only erode
the force of the initial estimate, which itself may have been quite arbitrary.54
Kaplow also argues that the market definition construct is predicated on a
standard reference market that has never been articulated and leads to wildly
varying estimations of what market power means.55  Finally, he argues that
using market shares to determine market power in relevant markets defined
further compounds the initial analytical errors of defining relevant markets
in the first place.56
The upshot of Kaplow’s paper is a strong recommendation that antitrust
analysis abandon market definition altogether,57 a position taken with some-
what less force in the Horizontal Merger Guidelines58 and apparently likely
to show up soon, at least as to merger analysis, in the influential Areeda Anti-
trust Law treatise.59  For the time being, market definition remains deeply
lodged in antitrust precedent on monopolization,60 the rule of reason,61 and
51 See Pitofsky, supra note 42, at 1816–17.
52 Id.; see HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 2, § 3, at 6 (noting that “[f]or
price discrimination to be feasible, two conditions typically must be met: differential pric-
ing and limited arbitrage”).
53 See Kaplow, supra note 7, at 440.
54 Id.
55 Id. at 462–65.
56 Id. at 440.
57 Id. (“The thesis of this Article is that the market definition process should be
abandoned.”).
58 See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 2, § 4 (explaining that market defi-
nition is merely an analytical tool available to conduct merger analysis and that some ana-
lytical tools used by the agencies do not rely on market definition at all).
59 See AREEDA ET AL., supra note 1.
60 See Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan, 506 U.S. 447, 452–53 (1993) (discussing the
need to prove market power in a relevant market in monopolization cases).
61 E.g., PSKS, Inc. v. Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc., 615 F.3d 412, 414 (5th Cir.
2010) (affirming dismissal of rule of reason challenge to vertical resale price maintenance
for failure to define relevant market); Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP Tour, Inc., 610 F.3d
820, 824 (3d Cir. 2010) (affirming grant of judgment as a matter of law on rule of reason
and monopolization claims for failure to prove relevant market).
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mergers62 although, as discussed next, cracks have already appeared.
Whether market definition disappears altogether, as Kaplow urges, or merely
undergoes a severe demotion, as appears in the Horizontal Merger Guide-
lines, it is reasonably clear that an as of yet undeveloped “direct” method of
proving market power is ascending.
C. Direct Proof: Present (Messy) Caselaw
Although the market definition/market share paradigm predominates
in antitrust analysis, formal doctrine holds that this is merely one of two avail-
able routes to proving market power; the other being a “direct” evidence
route.  The Supreme Court decision standing for this proposition—Federal
Trade Commission v. Indiana Federation of Dentists63 (IFD)—requires some
exploration because it is a fount of so much confusion in the lower courts.64
The controversy in IFD concerned an effort by Indiana dentists to deny
insurance companies access to dental x-rays in order to prevent the insurers
from overriding the dentists’ professional judgments.65  IFD was a profes-
sional association of fewer than 100 dentists in the Anderson, Lafayette, and
Fort Wayne, Indiana areas.66  IFD splintered off from the much larger Indi-
ana Dental Association (the Association) after the Association acceded to
antitrust pressures and dropped its rule prohibiting supplying x-rays to insur-
ers.67  IFD instituted the rule for its own members, and the FTC brought suit,
alleging an unlawful boycott.68
62 E.g., United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (rejecting
the government’s merger challenge for failure to prove relevant market).
63 FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists (IFD), 476 U.S. 447 (1986).
64 In addition to confusing the market power issues, the Court unwittingly confused
the definition of horizontal group boycotts.  In an earlier case, Northwest Wholesale Station-
ers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284 (1985), the Court limited the rule of
per se illegality for group boycotts to “joint efforts by a firm or firms to disadvantage com-
petitors by ‘either directly denying or persuading or coercing suppliers or customers to
deny relationships the competitors need in the competitive struggle.’” Id. at 294 (quoting
LAWRENCE ANTHONY SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 261–62 (1977)).  In
IFD, the Court rendered Northwest Wholesale’s holding as limiting the per se rule in “cases in
which firms with market power boycott suppliers or customers in order to discourage them
from doing business with a competitor.” 476 U.S. at 458.  This was an obvious error since it
implied that the illegal boycott must be directed against customers or suppliers in order to
force them to boycott a rival of the defendant.  Although such a pattern would be included
in the definition of a group boycott, it would hardly be necessary under the Court’s boycott
precedents, which involved suppliers or customers who participated without coercion in
the boycott scheme. See, e.g., Klor’s Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 212
(1959) (defining group boycott).
65 IFD, 476 U.S. at 448–49.
66 Id. at 451.
67 Id. at 450–51.
68 See id. at 451; see also In re Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 101 F.T.C. 57, 70 (1983) (finding
the formation of the IFD was motivated by desire to “evade the antitrust laws against
boycotts”).
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One of the issues on appeal was whether IFD possessed market power for
purposes of rule of reason analysis.69  The Supreme Court held that it did,
but through a set of gymnastic exercises that have left the doctrine in per-
plexity.70  IFD argued that it should prevail on the market power issue since
the FTC had never proven a relevant market.71  The Court rejected this argu-
ment, asserting that
[s]ince the purpose of the inquiries into market definition and market
power is to determine whether an arrangement has the potential for genu-
ine adverse effects on competition, “proof of actual detrimental effects, such
as a reduction of output,” can obviate the need for an inquiry into market
power, which is but a “surrogate for detrimental effects.”72
This language—the suggestion that the market definition/market power
method is just a circumstantial means of proving anticompetitive effects—has
provided the encouragement for lower courts to construct a “direct proof”
alternative.73
Unfortunately, what follows in IFD bars the case from providing any
meaningful guidance on direct evidence of market power.  Having estab-
lished that market definition is unnecessary when there is “proof of actual
detrimental effects, such as a reduction in output,” the Court turned to IFD’s
second argument: that the Commission failed to make any findings that the
boycott resulted in provision of more costly dental services.74  This much the
Court conceded, but found it irrelevant because a
concerted and effective effort to withhold (or make more costly) informa-
tion desired by consumers for the purpose of determining whether a particu-
lar purchase is cost justified is likely enough to disrupt the proper
functioning of the price-setting mechanism of the market that it may be con-
demned even absent proof that it resulted in higher prices.75
Having just dispensed with the requirement of proving a relevant market if
there was “proof of actual detrimental effects,” the Court dispensed with the
need to prove actual detrimental effects if those effects were “likely
enough.”76
IFD is confounding on its own terms, but can be rehabilitated on others.
Understood as a “Quick Look” case—one where the restraint on competition
is inherently suspect and the burden shifts immediately to the defendant to
69 IFD, 476 U.S. at 460–61.
70 Id. at 460–61.
71 Id.
72 Id. (quoting 7 PHILLIP E. AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW, ¶ 1511, at 429 (1986)).
73 E.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 51 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc)
(per curiam) (relying on IFD in holding that direct evidence of monopoly power is suffi-
cient in section 2 cases); Rebel Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1434 (9th Cir.
1995) (same).
74 IFD, 476 U.S. at 460–61 (quoting 7 AREEDA, supra note 72, ¶ 1511, at 429).
75 Id. at 461–62.
76 Id. at 460–61 (quoting 7 AREEDA, supra note 72, ¶ 1511, at 429).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\90-1\NDL102.txt unknown Seq: 15  8-DEC-14 14:32
2014] market  power  without  market  definition 45
offer a procompetitive justification—the case makes perfect sense.77  In such
a case, proof of market power may never be necessary.78  But by not making
this clear, the Court left it open to lower courts to waive the market defini-
tion/market share paradigm upon a showing of “direct evidence” of anti-
competitive effects, without offering any coherent explanation of what would
constitute direct evidence of such.
Without guidance from the Supreme Court, lower courts have tried to
specify the criteria for a direct evidence approach.79  The results are a baf-
fling potpourri.  Among the criteria identified by courts are: (1) evidence of
restricted output and supracompetitive prices;80 (2) the presence of entry
barriers;81 (3) the exclusion of competition;82 (4) control over prices;83 (5)
the defendant’s ability to engage in price discrimination;84 (6) “sustained
supranormal profits;”85 and (7) abrupt changes in practices following the
elimination of competitors.86
Taken as a set and in individual application, these criteria are generally
vacuous, confusing, or both.  The most commonly repeated maxim—that
proof of restricted output and supracompetitive prices establishes market
power—is not an analytical criterion at all but merely repeats the definition
of market power.  It amounts to saying that a plaintiff directly proves market
power when she directly proves market power.  Except that some courts also
go on to say that proof of supracompetitive prices without proof of reduced
output does not establish market power.87  This is baffling.  The relationship
77 See Andrew I. Gavil, Moving Beyond Caricature and Characterization: The Modern Rule of
Reason in Practice, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 733, 756 (2012).
78 See Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 336 (7th Cir. 2012) (stating that proof of market
power is not required in the quick look analysis); 11 HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW
¶ 1914d(1), at 315 (1998).
79 Not all courts have accepted the direct evidence approach for all species of antitrust
claims. See Christy Sports, LLC v. Deer Valley Resort Co., 555 F.3d 1188, 1198 (10th Cir.
2009) (observing that the Tenth Circuit had never ruled on the propriety of the direct
evidence approach in a monopolization case).
80 Theme Promotions, Inc. v. News Am. Mktg. FSI, 546 F.3d 991, 1001 (9th Cir. 2008);
Coastal Fuels of P.R., Inc. v. Caribbean Petrol. Corp., 79 F.3d 182, 196–97 (1st Cir. 1996).
81 Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 307 (3d Cir. 2007).
82 Heerwagen v. Clear Channel Commc’ns, 435 F.3d 219, 227 (2d Cir. 2006); Geneva
Pharms. Tech. Corp. v. Barr Labs. Inc., 386 F.3d 485, 500 (2d Cir. 2004); PepsiCo., Inc. v.
Coca-Cola Co., 315 F.3d 101, 107 (2d Cir. 2002); Conwood Co. v. U.S. Tobacco Co., 290
F.3d 768, 783 n.2 (6th Cir. 2002); Tops Mkts., Inc. v. Quality Mkts., Inc., 142 F.3d 90, 98
(2d Cir. 1998).
83 Broadcom, 501 F.3d at 307; Arani v. TriHealth Inc., 77 F. App’x 823, 826 (6th Cir.
2003); PepsiCo, 315 F.3d at 107.
84 United States v. Eastman Kodak Co., 63 F.3d 95, 106 (2d Cir. 1995).
85 Town Sound & Custom Tops, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 959 F.2d 468, 481 n.17
(3d Cir. 1992).
86 In re Crude Oil Commodity Futures Litig., 913 F. Supp. 2d 41, 51 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
87 E.g., Broadcom, 501 F.3d at 307 (stating that both “supracompetitive prices and
restricted output” are required to prove monopoly power directly); Geneva Pharms., 386
F.3d at 500 (rejecting plaintiff’s direct proof of monopoly power argument where plaintiff
failed to show reduced output); Forsyth v. Humana, Inc., 114 F.3d 1467, 1476 (9th Cir.
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between price increases and output levels is the elasticity of demand.  If price
increases without a reduction in demand and therefore in output, this is
because demand at this point on the demand curve is completely inelastic.
In economic theory, inelastic demand generally correlates with higher levels
of market power than elastic demand, since it means that sellers have greater
power to profit from price increases.88  Although price increases without out-
put reductions cause no deadweight losses and hence no loss of allocative
efficiency,89 they still result in wealth transfers from consumers to producers
and hence diminish consumer welfare.90  Unless one understands the insis-
tence on proof of output reduction as a back-door replacement of a con-
sumer welfare standard with an allocative efficiency standard91—a dubious
explanation—the output reduction requirement on top of the supracompeti-
tive pricing criterion makes no sense.
Further, the exclusion of rival producers of differentiated but competi-
tive products may actually result in increased output by the excluding firms.92
To use an illustration from Krattenmaker, Lande, and Salop,93 suppose that
a group of widget producers takes anticompetitive action to raise the produc-
tion costs of gadgets, which are a good substitute for widgets.  As the price of
gadgets increases, they will either be discontinued or no longer good substi-
tutes for widgets.  In that event, widget manufacturers may expand their out-
put even while increasing their prices.  Consumer welfare suffers.94  It is true
that the aggregate output of widgets and gadgets falls, but proving that would
defeat the entire purpose of a “direct evidence” approach, since it would
require proving that widgets and gadgets are good substitutes—the very core
of the troublesome “indirect” approach.95
As discussed in greater detail in the next Part, the entry barrier, profit
margin, price discrimination, and “before and after” criteria are similarly ill-
fitting, imprecise, or underspecified.  In brief, entry barrier analysis assumes
the definition of a relevant market and therefore fits oddly in a “direct proof”
analysis meant to obviate the need of proving relevant markets.  Profit mar-
1997) (“The plaintiffs submitted evidence that Sunrise Hospital routinely charged higher
prices than other hospitals while reaping high profits.  With no accompanying showing of
restricted output, however, the plaintiffs have failed to present direct evidence of market
power.”).
88 See Kaplow, supra note 7, at 448–53.
89 ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 104–06 (1978).
90 See HOVENKAMP, supra note 33, at 21–23.
91 See generally Robert H. Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of
Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged, 34 HASTINGS L.J. 65, 69–70 (1982) (noting
that “[a] second group of analysts believe that in addition to enhanced economic effi-
ciency, various social, moral, and political goals were important to the antitrust laws’
framers”).
92 See Krattenmaker et al., supra note 27, at 250 (explaining that under conditions of
Bainian exclusion, output and market shares of excluding firms increase).
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 See supra Section I.B.
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gin analysis easily results in both false positives and negatives.  “Before and
after” scenarios rarely appear with clean boundaries and, when they do, can
often be misleading.  And market power is unnecessary for price discrimina-
tion, and therefore produces false positives if used as a market power
criterion.
What’s more, even courts and agencies that pursue a direct evidence
approach usually do so in the shadow of the market definition/market share
paradigm.  In Microsoft, the D.C. Circuit’s en banc decision noted that since
“direct proof is only rarely available, courts more typically examine market
structure in search of circumstantial evidence of monopoly power,”96 a pearl
of wisdom embraced by a number of other courts as well.97  But market defi-
nition is also conceptually difficult and taxing, so courts often consider the
direct and circumstantial proof approaches in parallel, permitting impreci-
sions in each approach to compensate for the imprecisions in the other.
Thus, courts have observed that IFD, although permitting a direct evidence
approach, still included evidence substantiating the “rough contours of the
relevant market”98 and have suggested that plaintiffs following a direct evi-
dence approach should make at least a half-hearted effort at proof of a rele-
vant market and market shares.99  Similarly, in the 2010 Horizontal Merger
Guidelines, the FTC and Justice Department state that “[s]ome of the analyti-
cal tools used by the Agencies to assess competitive effects do not rely on
market definition, although evaluation of competitive alternatives available
to customers is always necessary at some point in the analysis.”100  Since
“competitive alternatives available to customers” is just a less precise way of
saying market definition, this amounts to a confession that even direct
approaches to market power entail some rough consideration of the analytic
questions that direct approaches were meant to circumvent.
All of this points to the uncomfortable possibility that the gradual
demise of market definition and ascendancy of “direct” evidence may create
the worst of all possible worlds—a tentative and unconfident direct effects
approach that leans on relaxed evidence of market definition when the tools
of market definition have been exposed as vacuous.  An analysis of the candi-
date tools of direct evidence is the subject of the next Part.
96 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 51 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (en banc) (per
curiam).
97 See Harrison Aire, Inc. v. Aerostar Int’l, Inc., 423 F.3d 374, 381 (3d Cir. 2005).
98 Republic Tobacco Co. v. N. Atl. Trading Co., 381 F.3d 717, 737 (7th Cir. 2004).
99 See, e.g., Cason-Merenda v. Detroit Med. Ctr., 862 F. Supp. 2d 603, 648–49 (E.D.
Mich. 2012); Audio Car Stereo, Inc. v. Little Guys, Inc., No. 04 C 3562, 2004 WL 3019298,
at *7 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 28, 2004).
100 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 2, § 4, at 7.
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II. CANDIDATE TOOLS OF DIRECT EVIDENCE
A. Entry Barriers
1. Entry Barriers and Direct Analysis
Barriers to entry play a central role in market power analysis.101  They
have typically been considered an indispensable element in proving the exis-
tence of market power,102 since if entry is easy, any short-run market power
quickly erodes.  Closely related to entry barriers are barriers to expansion,
which prevent firms already in the market from growing to a more efficient
scale and hence making the market more competitive.103  For present pur-
poses the distinction between entry and expansion barriers is immaterial and
both phenomena safely can be referred to as entry barriers.
Entry barriers have traditionally been considered in “indirect” market
power analysis as confirming or calling into question inferences drawn from
the defendant’s market share.104  It is questionable whether entry barriers
can be coherently deployed in a “direct” market power analysis since entry
barriers require identification of a market into which entry is difficult.  Thus,
for example, assume that the supply of satellite transponders for use in satel-
lite radio services is extremely limited and would constitute an entry barrier
into satellite radio services if that were a proper relevant market.  One cannot
know whether transponder scarcity is a barrier unless there is, economically,
a satellite radio market.105  In reviewing the Sirius/XM merger, the Justice
Department concluded that satellite radio is not a market unto itself,106
101 Two possible understandings of entry barriers have been proposed without clear
resolution in the courts.  The Harvard or “structuralist” school conceived of entry barriers
as any impediment to the free flow of capital into the market.  JOE S. BAIN, BARRIERS TO
NEW COMPETITION 6–7 (1956).  By contrast, the Chicago School conceived of entry barriers
much more narrowly: as costs faced by new entrants but not by incumbents. GEORGE J.
STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 67 (1968); see Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 56 (discussing
the disagreement between the two schools and finding it unnecessary to take sides); Her-
bert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Costs of Movement, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 67, 76–80 (2012)
(arguing that the Harvard definition of entry barriers is superior).
102 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 591 n.15 (1986)
(observing that without entry barriers it is “impossible to maintain supracompetitive prices
for an extended time”); Broadcom Corp. v. Qualcomm Inc., 501 F.3d 297, 307 (3d Cir.
2007) (monopoly power requires a showing that “significant ‘entry barriers’ protect [the]
market” (quoting Harrison Aire, 423 F.3d at 381)).
103 See Rebel Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 51 F.3d 1421, 1440 (9th Cir. 1995).
104 HOVENKAMP, supra note 33, § 1.6.
105 In approving the merger between the only two existing satellite radio services—
Sirius and XM—the Justice Department concluded that satellite radio did not face compe-
tition from land-based services and hence, that satellite radio services were not a relevant
market for antitrust purposes.  Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Statement of the Dep’t of
Justice Antitrust Div. on its Decision to Close its Investigation of XM Satellite Radio Hold-
ings Inc.’s Merger with Sirius Satellite Radio Inc. (Mar. 24, 2008), http://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/2008/March/08_at_226.html.
106 Id.
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which would seem to moot any discussion about entry barriers into the non-
existent satellite radio market.  Unmoored from market definition, entry bar-
rier analysis lacks precision at best and coherence at worst.
Nonetheless, courts have assumed that entry barriers are important in
direct analysis of market power as well.107  This is further evidence that even
as formal market definition fades, rough intuitions on the boundaries of the
relevant market continue to play a role—as they did in Indiana Federation of
Dentists and continue to do under the Horizontal Merger Guidelines.108
Even without formally defining a relevant market, courts and antitrust
enforcers deploy rough understandings about the area of effective competi-
tion in determining whether access to that area is easy or difficult.  Given its
long and important history in antitrust, entry barrier analysis is likely to
retain a prominent role in a post-market definition world.  It is therefore
important to make sure that the concept is rightly framed.
2. Entry Barriers and the Competitive Counterfactual
In defining market power, one should distinguish between two kinds of
entry barriers.  First, there are structural entry barriers—market characteris-
tics not intentionally created by market actors to stymie entry but nonetheless
deterring entry.  Examples include governmental regulations, resource scar-
city, and network effects.109  Second, some entry barriers are created by firms
in the market with the object of excluding competitors.  Examples include
exclusive dealing and tying contracts, which can lock up the market or other-
wise inhibit new entrants.110  Entry barriers in the second category are typi-
cally analyzed as part of the inquiry into whether the defendants engaged in
exclusionary behavior and, hence, are intertwined with the anticompetitive
conduct element.
The first category—structural barriers—poses conceptual difficulties for
market power analysis.  Antitrust reasoning generally treats structural market
power as an element separate from the anticompetitive conduct element.
The plaintiff must first show that the defendant has market power in an
107 See, e.g., Broadcom, 501 F.3d at 307 (listing “[b]arriers to entry . . . such as regulatory
requirements, high capital costs, or technological obstacles, that prevent new competition
from entering a market in response to a monopolist’s supracompetitive prices” as factors in
determining direct evidence of market power); Harrison Aire, 423 F.3d at 381 (“Monopoly
power can be demonstrated with either direct evidence of supracompetitive pricing and
high barriers to entry, or with structural evidence of a monopolized market.” (citation
omitted)).
108 See supra text accompanying notes 58, 69–78.
109 Broadcom, 501 F.3d at 307 (“Barriers to entry are factors, such as regulatory require-
ments, high capital costs, or technological obstacles, that prevent new competition from
entering a market in response to a monopolist’s supracompetitive prices.”).
110 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs, Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 485 (1992)
(discussing creation of entry barriers through tying arrangements that require rivals to
enter two markets simultaneously); Interface Grp., Inc. v. Mass. Port Auth., 816 F.2d 9, 11
(1st Cir. 1987) (discussing the propensity of exclusive dealing contracts to raise entry
barriers).
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abstract sense and then identify the anticompetitive conduct that created or
enhanced this power.111  The higher entry barriers are, the more plausible it
is thought that the firms in the market would engage in anticompetitive con-
duct and the more pernicious the anticompetitive effects.112  Hence, a
debate about whether entry barriers are “high” is often a key part of the con-
testation over market power.113  The assumption that the higher the entry
barriers the more likely that pernicious anticompetitive conduct has
occurred—what I will call the linear relation assumption—is sometimes right
and sometimes backwards.
In two contexts—non-exclusionary conspiracy114 and horizontal merger
cases—the linear relation assumption is generally correct.115  For analytical
purposes, horizontal merger is just a strong form of cooperative agreement
between competitors, and hence of a kind with nonexclusionary conspiracy.
When firms collude to raise prices above competitive levels, this attracts new
capital to the market, absent entry barriers.116  Entry barriers inhibit the
111 HOVENKAMP, supra note 33, at 40–41.
112 See, e.g., ZF Meritor, LLC v. Eaton Corp., 696 F.3d 254, 285 (3d Cir. 2012) (relying
on evidence that barriers to entry were “especially high”); E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co.
v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 637 F.3d 435, 451 (4th Cir. 2011) (finding that counter-claimant had
adequately pled market power based in part on allegation of “numerous barriers to
entry”); West Penn Allegheny Health Sys., Inc. v. UPMC, 627 F.3d 85, 104 (3d Cir. 2010)
(finding exclusion complaint adequately pled based in part on allegation of “significant
entry barriers”); Theme Promotions, Inc. v. News Am. Mktg. FSI, 546 F.3d 991, 1002 (9th
Cir. 2008) (finding the presence of “high entry barriers” significant in affirming jury ver-
dict for plaintiff in exclusion case); Broadcom, 501 F.3d at 307 (holding that “significant
‘entry barriers’” support plaintiff’s exclusion claim (quoting Harrison Aire, 423 F.3d at
381)).
113 See cases cited supra note 107.
114 Cartels and other anticompetitive conspiracies often involve both an element of
cooperation between the insiders and coordinated exclusion of outsiders. See generally
Joseph E. Harrington, Jr., How Do Cartels Operate?, in 2 FOUNDATIONS & TRENDS IN
MICROECONOMICS 1, 64–69 (2006) (describing the efforts taken by various cartels to limit
the impact of non-cartel suppliers who purchase a cartel’s product and resell it, either
directly or in an altered form); Randal D. Heeb et al., Cartels as Two-Stage Mechanisms:
Implications for the Analysis of Dominant-Firm Conduct, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 213, 217 (2009)
(noting that the first stage of cartel activity involves reaching consensus on curbing rivalry
while the second stage of cartel activity focuses on exclusionary behavior); C. Scott Hemp-
hill & Tim Wu, Parallel Exclusion, 122 YALE L.J. 1182 (2012) (arguing that parallel exclusion
can be more harmful than parallel price elevation); Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y.
Suslow, Breaking Up Is Hard to Do: Determinants of Cartel Duration, 54 J.L. & ECON. 455, 483
(2011) (stating that exclusionary actions increase cartel stability); Margaret C. Levenstein
& Valerie Y. Suslow, What Determines Cartel Success?, 44 J. ECON. LITERATURE 43, 74–75
(2006) (surveying the results of studies on exclusionary practices).
115 As noted at the outset, supra text accompanying note 15, under current doctrine the
market power requirement is inapplicable to “hard core” price-fixing conspiracies.  Here, I
am using “conspiracy” in a broader sense to denote all cooperative anticompetitive agree-
ments that do not involve an exclusionary element.
116 Roger D. Blair et al., Collusive Duopoly: The Economic Effects of the Aloha and Hawaiian
Airlines’ Agreement to Reduce Capacity, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 409, 434 (2007).
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attraction of conspiracy-eroding new capital, and hence are positively corre-
lated with nonexclusionary conspiracies.  If we conceive of the “height” of
entry barriers as an expression of the likelihood of new entry and posit that
the probability of nonexclusionary conspiracy is inversely correlated with the
probability of new entry, then it follows that the higher the entry barriers, the
more likely that challenged conduct was in fact anticompetitive conspiracy.
But the linear relation assumption does not follow for allegedly exclu-
sionary behavior.  The relationship between the competitive counterfactual
and entry barriers is not linear, as generally assumed and represented in Fig-
ure 1 below.  Rather, the relationship between the height of entry barriers
and the probability that an antitrust violation has occurred is a reverse c-
shaped curve, as illustrated in Figure 2.  When entry barriers are low, it is
unlikely that there is a competitive counterfactual since the market is already
functioning near its competitive optimum.  That much is well understood.117
What follows is not.  When structural entry barriers are very high, it is also
unlikely that there is a competitive counterfactual, both because it is unlikely
that the defendant engaged in exclusionary conduct and because it is
unlikely that there would have been entry even absent any exclusionary con-
duct.  The slope of the upper portion of the curve back toward the y-axis
requires elaboration because it has been largely or completely overlooked.
FIGURE 1: ASSUMED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ENTRY BARRIERS
AND ANTITRUST VIOLATIONS
117 See, e.g., United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 532 (1973) (stating
that potential entrants to markets with low entry barriers discipline the behavior of firms in
the market); Ball Mem’l Hosp., Inc. v. Mut. Hosp. Ins., Inc., 784 F.2d 1325, 1335 (7th Cir.
1986) (noting that “the lower the barriers to entry, and the shorter the lags of new entry,
the less power existing firms have”).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\90-1\NDL102.txt unknown Seq: 22  8-DEC-14 14:32
52 notre dame law review [vol. 90:1
FIGURE 2: ACTUAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ENTRY BARRIERS
AND COMPETITIVE COUNTERFACTUAL
The curve’s convexity derives from two related phenomena: the willing-
ness of firms to spend resources on exclusion and the likelihood that absent
exclusion there would be new entry.  Begin by observing that exclusion is
always costly or at least probabilistically costly.  Some forms of exclusion, such
as predatory pricing or predatory innovation, are extremely expensive.118
But even forms of “cheap exclusion”119 which cost the excluding firm little in
out-of-pocket expenses or direct opportunity costs, are costly in one impor-
tant sense: they create the possibility that rivals will complain to antitrust
agencies, sue, or even win treble damages judgments.120  Hence, even firms
considering the less directly costly forms of exclusion should factor in anti-
trust liability in deciding whether to proceed.
Firms are less likely to make the investment in exclusion when either of
two conditions is present: (1) exclusion of any rival is unlikely to create dura-
ble121 market power since other rivals can freely enter; or (2) investments in
exclusion are unnecessary since structural entry barriers are alone sufficient
118 Frank H. Easterbrook, Predatory Strategies and Counterstrategies, 48 U. CHI. L. REV. 263,
268 (1981); John S. McGee, Predatory Pricing Revisited, 23 J.L. & ECON. 289, 292 (1980).
119 Susan A. Creighton et al., Cheap Exclusion, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 975 (2005).
120 See Daniel A. Crane, The Paradox of Predatory Pricing, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 3 (2005)
(analyzing incentives of private plaintiffs to bring challenges to exclusionary conduct even
when those claims are unlikely to succeed).
121 Durable here means of sufficient duration to recoup the exclusionary investment.
See generally C. Scott Hemphill, Note, The Role of Recoupment in Predatory Pricing Analyses, 53
STAN. L. REV. 1581 (2001) (arguing that a major difficulty for successful predatory pricing
is the inability to achieve high-enough profits from reduced competition in order to make
the anticompetitive price cut worthwhile).
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to deter new entry.  To illustrate, consider two corporate CEOs in polar
opposite market positions but each with a similar disincentive to invest in
exclusionary conduct.  The first runs an online retail store for popular and
widely available electronic goods.  This firm has no market power in a con-
ventional sense and would be unlikely to invest in excluding any online com-
petitor in order to increase its pricing discretion since any number of others
could easily take its place.  The second CEO runs a pharmaceutical firm with
a branded drug under patent for another six years and no close therapeutic
substitutes.  Several generic drug manufacturers are thought to be exploring
ways to market a generic substitute, but the possibility that they will be able to
obtain FDA approval before the expiration of the patent is extremely low.
The CEO makes clear to his executives that the generics are to be left alone.
Since they are so unlikely to enter anyway, taking actions that could be even
suggestive of anticompetitive intent would create unnecessary risk and
expense.
These two CEOs represent the firms on the opposite ends of the curve at
the same point on the x-axis.  One has no market power in a conventional
sense and the other has a high degree of it, and yet both face equally strong
disincentives to engage in exclusionary conduct.  In between them, at the
center of the curve, reside the firms most likely to engage in exclusionary
conduct.  These firms operate in markets with middling entry barriers and
hence enjoy middling market power in a conventional sense.  They have
more to gain by excluding rivals than our hypothesized CEOs because (1) if
the existing rivals are excluded, it is uncertain that others will be able to
enter, and (2) unless these rivals are excluded through anticompetitive
means, there is a good chance that they will enter.
The second factor relating to the competitive counterfactual is the
probability that but for the exclusionary conduct the market would be more
competitive.  Here again, entry barriers form a convex curve.  Where entry
barriers are low, it is probable that the market is already as competitive as it
can be.  Not only will our retail CEO not obtain market power by excluding a
competitor, but he operates in a market that is fully competitive.  There is no
plausible competitive counterfactual.  Our pharmaceutical CEO differs inso-
far as he presently enjoys conventional market power—he prices far above
competitive levels.  But he is the same insofar as there is also no plausible
competitive counterfactual.  Assume that through mistake or spite the phar-
maceutical CEO takes anticompetitive action against the generics.  Consumer
interests are no worse off than they would have been otherwise, since the
generics would not have entered even absent the conduct.
For purposes of exclusion analysis, then, the degrees of market power
arising from entry barriers that should be of greatest interest to antitrust pol-
icy are those somewhere between the poles—not, as usually assumed, those at
the heights.  This perhaps surprising observation suggests that antitrust law
has been wrong to ask for proof of “high” entry barriers in exclusion cases.
The entry barriers most likely to be associated with exclusionary conduct are
those that narrow the number of potential entrants but are surmountable by
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a small set of potential rivals.  It is in those cases that dominant firms in the
market have most to gain, and consumers most to lose, from exclusion
strategies.
B. Profit Margins
Profit margins are a tempting focus in a direct evidence analysis because
of the intuition that dominant firms earn supracompetitive profits.  But
profit margin analysis has long been recognized as problematic, both for its
tendency to exonerate firms that actually do possess economic power and to
condemn those that do not.  This is true of both kinds of profit margins—
operating or fully allocated margins and direct or incremental cost margins.
And it is true of any analytical tool that makes market power assumptions
based on profit margin analysis.
1. Inability to Exclude Possibility of Market Power
One immediate problem with inferring market power from profit mar-
gins is that this approach is at best a one-way street.  Even if the presence of
high profit margins could demonstrate the presence of market power, their
absence cannot rule it out.  This was perhaps Judge Learned Hand’s most
penetrating observation in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,122 where
the Second Circuit rejected Alcoa’s claim that its ordinary profit margins
negated any inference of market power.123  Hand recognized that dominant
firms may internally consume their monopoly profits through sloth, waste,
and managerial excess, which show up on the balance sheet as costs of the
firm and therefore keep accounting profit margins in the range of competi-
tive industries.124  As Nobel laureate John Hicks famously put it, “[t]he best
of all monopoly profits is a quiet life.”125
Depending on how profit margins are calculated, the absence of monop-
oly profits may not show up on the balance sheets of firms with market power
for another reason: when business assets such as patents, plants, or corporate
divisions that produce market power are sold, the seller retains the monopoly
value as part of his remuneration.126  If the asset acquisition costs are amor-
122 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
123 Id. at 427.
124 Id. (“Many people believe that possession of unchallenged economic power dead-
ens initiative, discourages thrift and depresses energy; that immunity from competition is a
narcotic, and rivalry is a stimulant, to industrial progress; that the spur of constant stress is
necessary to counteract an inevitable disposition to let well enough alone.”).
125 J.R. Hicks, Annual Survey of Economic Theory: The Theory of Monopoly, 3 ECONOMETRICA
1, 8 (1935).
126 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Material Basis of Jurisprudence, 69 IND. L.J. 1, 10
(1993) (observing that “the modern purchaser of stock in a corporation that has a patent
or other monopoly buys a right to receive a proportionate share of the firm’s expected
monopoly profits, but the right yields him only a competitive expected return on his invest-
ment, not a monopoly return, because the expected monopoly profits have been dis-
counted in the purchase price of the stock”).
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tized, then the producing firm will not show abnormal operating profits
because those profits have been transferred to another firm’s balance
sheet.127  Given the high mobility of market-power producing assets, many
firms that possess market power in an economic sense do not earn monopoly
profits in an accounting sense.
2. Operating Margins and the Bain Index
Profitability calculations supporting a market power determination
could be performed on either a “direct” or “fully allocated” cost basis.  Under
ordinary accounting conventions, direct costs are those incremental to a par-
ticular product line whereas indirect costs are those that support the overall
business.128  Revenues minus direct costs yields direct margins and revenues
minus total costs (the sum of direct and indirect costs) yields operating mar-
gins.  Neither profitability measure provides a satisfactory indicator of market
power.
First, consider operating margins.  Economist Joe Bain, whose structural-
ist approach had a profound effect on U.S. antitrust policy during the 1950s
and 1960s,129 proposed a market power index approaching an operating
margin analysis.130  It would measure monopoly power based on a formula of
revenues minus currently incurred material costs, wage and salaries, depreci-
ation on capital investments, the interest rate on capital funds, and the
owner’s investment.131
Operating margin indices like the Bain Index flounder on the allocation
of joint and common costs to particular product segments.  Trying to quan-
tify profits on an operating or fully allocated basis for any particular business
segment produces economically arbitrary results,132 because the allocation of
joint and common costs to business lines is arbitrary from an economic per-
spective.133  From an accounting perspective, firms allocate costs for many
reasons that bear no relationship to market power—such as tax treatment,
127 See W. KIP VISCUSI ET AL., ECONOMICS OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 260 (3d ed.
2000) (observing that “[a]ssets that have been sold may also include in their accounting
value the present value of monopoly profits, and this makes it impossible to detect eco-
nomic profits”); Richard Squire, Antitrust and the Supremacy Clause, 59 STAN. L. REV. 77, 127
(2006) (noting that if a monopoly license is sold at a public auction, the sales price will
equal the difference between the purchaser’s expected profits and a normal rate of return
on capital).
128 MICHAEL W. MAHER ET AL., MANAGERIAL ACCOUNTING 453 (11th ed. 2012).
129 See Daniel Crane, Structuralism: Introduction, in THE MAKING OF COMPETITION POLICY
318, 318–20 (Daniel A. Crane & Herbert Hovenkamp eds., 2013).
130 Joe S. Bain, The Profit Rate as a Measure of Monopoly Power, 55 Q.J. ECON. 271 (1941).
131 VISCUSI ET AL., supra note 127, at 260.
132 See Franklin M. Fisher & John J. McGowan, On the Misuse of Accounting Rates of Return
to Infer Monopoly Profits, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 82, 82 (1983).
133 Elizabeth M. Bailey et al., Making Sense of “Apportionment” in Patent Damages, 12
COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 255, 261 (2011); William J. Baumol, On the Proper Cost Tests for
Natural Monopoly in a Multiproduct Industry, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 809, 809 (1977); Louis
Kaplow & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 1073, 1087–88
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accounting convenience, measuring value for casualty insurance purposes,
and delineating contractual obligations to joint venture partners.134  For
example, standard accounting conventions require firms to distinguish
between main products and by-products and only allocate joint costs to main
products.135  Thus, if kerosene is considered a by-product of gasoline produc-
tion, then the joint and common costs of petroleum extraction and refining
would be allocated entirely to gasoline and not to kerosene.136  Kerosene
sales might thus look extremely profitable on an accounting basis—implying
market power to anyone naı¨vely using operating profits to detect market
power.
Accounting profits have little relevance to the way firms actually make
pricing decisions.  Unless rate regulated, firms do not generally price individ-
ual products based on an allocation of joint and common costs.  But suppose
that they did.137  To maximize output, firms would allocate joint costs
inversely to the elasticity of demand.138  In that case, the operating margins
of the different units within the firm would tend to equalize, with the result
that business segments where the firm faced relatively little competition (and
hence inelastic demand) would show relatively similar operating profits to
business segments where the firm faced stiffer competition and hence
greater elasticity.139  The upshot would be that profit margins would conceal
anything meaningful about the firm’s economic power in its various product
segments.
These are reasons that the absence of supranormal operating profits
does not indicate the absence of market power.  It does not follow, however,
that the existence of “excess profits” affirmatively demonstrates the presence
of market power in a sense relevant to antitrust law, as Bain claimed.140  As
already seen, operating profits as to any particular product segment may
(A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007); Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly and
Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 548, 595 (1969).
134 MAHER ET AL., supra note 128, at 453–97.
135 RONALD W. HILTON ET AL., COST MANAGEMENT 356 (2d ed. 2003).
136 Id.
137 Einer Elhauge, Why Above-Cost Price Cuts to Drive Out Entrants Are Not Predatory—and
the Implications for Defining Costs and Market Power, 112 YALE L.J. 681, 734–35 (2003) (discuss-
ing allocation of joint and common costs in airline pricing).
138 See 1 ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 77–83 (1970); WILLIAM J.
BAUMOL & DAVID F. BRADFORD, Optimal Departures from Marginal Cost Pricing, 60 AM. ECON.
REV. 265 (1970); F.P. Ramsey, A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation, 37 ECON. J. 47 (1927).
139 To illustrate, assume a firm with two product lines, A and B.  A is a highly differenti-
ated product whose customers have few close substitutes.  In a conventional sense, this is a
product over which the firm has considerable market power.  B is a more homogenous
product with good substitutes.  The firm will tend to allocate joint and common costs to A
since that will diminish sales of A less than it would of B.  The upshot is that the operating
profit margins on A and B may look similar even though the firm has conventional market
power over A and not over B.
140 Bain, supra note 130, at 274 (“Although excess profits (a price-average cost discrep-
ancy) are thus not a sure indication of monopoly, they are, if persistent, a probable
indication.”).
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represent nothing other than an economically arbitrary cost allocation
scheme.  Further, a firm’s high profit margins may be nothing but a reflec-
tion of Ricardian rents141—profits derived from scarce productive resources
conferring a cost advantage, or more generally, superior productive effi-
ciency.142  When a firm’s profits reflect Ricardian rents, there is no competi-
tive counterfactual, since the scarcity of the relevant assets means that the
general market price will reflect the efficiency of the least efficient
producers.143
3. Direct Margins and the Lerner Index
The Bain Index has obtained little traction as a measure of market
power in economic literature or judicial precedent.  By contrast, the Lerner
Index, which quantifies market power based on the excess of price over
direct or marginal cost,144 is widely discussed as an objective economic mea-
sure of market power.145  The Lerner Index nominally faces no arbitrary cost
allocations,146 since it only takes into account costs directly attributable to a
particular product line.  It is predicated on the assumption that, under per-
fect competition, firms price at marginal cost.  Hence the magnitude of mar-
ket power is simply the magnitude of the deviation from marginal cost.
The Lerner Index is misaligned with the competitive counterfactual
since most markets could not function if prices were equated to marginal
cost.  This is well recognized as to dynamic markets, like pharmaceuticals,
where large fixed investments in research and development (R&D) are nec-
essary to the creation of new technologies.147  But it is also true as to any
141 DAVID RICARDO, ON THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, AND TAXATION 91–108
(R.M. Hartwell ed., 1971).
142 See Ariel Katz, Making Sense of Nonsense: Intellectual Property, Antitrust, and Market
Power, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 837, 868–69 (2007).
143 See Michael A. Williams et al., Estimating Monopoly Power with Economic Profits, 10 U.C.
DAVIS BUS. L.J. 125, 143 (2010) (explaining how accounting practice of carrying assets at
the lower of historical or market value may generate large accounting profits that reflect
only Ricardian rents but may be easily mistaken for market power).
144 See supra text accompanying note 12.
145 See Kaplow, supra note 7 at 446; Landes & Posner, supra note 12, at 938.
146 This statement gives the Lerner Index the benefit of the doubt, since the determina-
tion of whether costs are direct or indirect is often a tremendously complicated task.
147 See, e.g., ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 40
(2007) (discussing the false positive created by applying Lerner Index to the pharmaceuti-
cal industry where firms expend millions of dollars in research and development to create
new drugs); Kenneth G. Elzinga & David E. Mills, The Lerner Index of Monopoly Power: Origins
and Uses, AM. ECON. REV.: PAPERS & PROCEEDINGS, May 2011, at 558, 559 (noting that the
Lerner Index “does not encompass dynamic effects that are relevant to the social optimum
generated by technological change, innovation, and learning by doing”); Jith Jayaratne &
Janusz A. Ordover, Economics and Competition Policy: A Two-Sided Market?, 27 ANTITRUST 78,
79 (2012) (observing that in markets characterized by “very high fixed costs and relatively
modest variable costs, there is little probative value in side-specific Lerner Indices”); Rob-
ert S. Pindyck, The Measurement of Monopoly Power in Dynamic Markets, 28 J.L. & ECON. 193,
194 (1985) (criticizing use of Lerner Index to gauge market power in dynamic markets).
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market with significant fixed costs,148 which is most of the industries where
big-ticket antitrust cases occur today.  For example, computer programming,
Internet search engines, microprocessors, telecommunications services,
pharmaceuticals, news media, film, music recording, aviation, and tertiary
health care are all industries characterized by very high fixed costs.  One
could safely say, with Landes and Posner, that use of the Lerner Index to
infer market power would be inappropriate “[w]hen the deviation of price
from marginal cost . . . simply reflects certain fixed costs,”149 but that is such
a ubiquitous condition in the modern economy that it seems hard to justify
employing the Lerner Index in antitrust cases with the caveat that it doesn’t
apply to high fixed cost industries.  Rather than directing the fact finder
toward factors likely to clarify the market power question, it bogs down the
process in the doldrums of cost accounting with the likely prospect that, in
the end, the Lerner Index will not help at all.  Recognizing that the Lerner
Index channels purist economic theory rather than plausible assumptions
about markets, most courts have rejected application of the Lerner Index in
antitrust cases.150
Recently, however, a variant of the Lerner Index has cropped up in the
2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, with potentially expansive implications
148 See 2A AREEDA ET AL., supra note 1, ¶ 516g, at 126 (“No matter how accurately mea-
sured, of course, a substantial excess of price over marginal cost does not necessarily bring
excess returns on investment.  A firm generates excess profit only if price exceeds its aver-
age total cost, including its cost of capital.”); DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF,
MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 92 (3d ed. 2000) (“Prices may exceed marginal cost
even though profits are not above competitive levels.  For example, if there are large
enough fixed costs, profits may be zero even if price exceeds marginal cost.”); CARL SHA-
PIRO, ANTITRUST, INNOVATION, AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: TESTIMONY BEFORE THE ANTI-
TRUST MODERNIZATION COMMISSION, ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMM’N 6–7 (2005),
available at http://faculty.haas.berkeley.edu/shapiro/amcexclusion.pdf (testimony of Carl
Shapiro, Professor, University of California at Berkeley) (explaining that it is an error to
infer genuine market power from the gap between marginal cost and price and that, while
the “error may be more common or more pronounced in innovative industries . . . it is not
confined to such industries” since in many industries “competitive price can easily and
significantly exceed marginal cost”).
149 Landes & Posner, supra note 12, at 939.
150 See, e.g., United States v. Eastman Kodak Co., 63 F.3d 95, 109 (2d Cir. 1995) (“Cer-
tain deviations between marginal cost and price, such as those resulting from high fixed
costs, are not evidence of market power.”); Kaiser Found. v. Abbott Labs., No. CV 02-2443-
JFW (FMOx), 2009 WL 3877513, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 8, 2009) (“[T]he pricing difference
between a brand name drug . . . and its generic equivalent does not reflect supra-competi-
tive pricing, but the fact that . . . generics do not incur the substantial research and devel-
opment expenses incurred by companies that develop and produce brand name drugs.”);
In re Fresh Del Monte Pineapples Antitrust Litig., No. 04-md-1628 (RMB)(MHD), 2009 WL
3241401, at *7 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2009) (evidence of a “huge operating profit to sales
ratio” insufficient to establish monopoly power), aff’d sub nom. Am. Banana Co. v. J.
Bonafede Co., 407 F. App’x 520 (2d Cir. 2010); In re Wireless Tel. Servs. Antitrust Litig.,
385 F. Supp. 2d 403, 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (“[T]he test for the existence of market power is
the ability to control price or exclude competition, not simply pricing a product above
marginal cost . . . .” (citation omitted)).
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for assumptions about market power.151  One of the tools that the agencies
have long used to define relevant markets is Critical Loss Analysis, which
seeks to determine whether the predictive actual loss in sales attendant to a
small but significant price increase would exceed the critical loss—i.e., the
levels of loss at which the price increase would become unprofitable because
the revenues lost from customers who stopped buying would exceed the reve-
nues gained from customers who continued to buy at higher prices.152  The
key driver of predicted loss is the elasticity of demand.  Traditionally, the
agencies estimated demand elasticity through a variety of tools including
econometric models, natural experiments, price correlations, and documen-
tary or witness evidence.153  However, in scholarly writings,154 the 2010
Guidelines, and a successful enforcement action against H&R Block,155 the
agencies have proposed or utilized a more “direct” means of proving elastic-
ity—through the merging firms’ profit margins on an incremental cost basis.
The net effect is to reintroduce the Lerner Index through the back door as a
means of demonstrating market power in merger cases—a technical move
that could dramatically expand the scope of federal anti-merger
enforcement.
Critics of the agencies’ new approach argue that introducing the Lerner
approach to merger analysis risks very significant false positives, as large seg-
ments of the economy characterized by product differentiation and high
fixed costs will become inherently suspect in merger analysis.156  The Lerner
Index is useful in specifying elasticities only under textbook conditions such
as “where competition is straightforward to model and thus effectively static,
short run marginal costs control the price decision, and both the demand
and cost curves are smooth around the equilibrium point.”157  Since most
151 See generally Joseph J. Simons & Malcolm B. Coate, Should DOJ’s Controversial
Approach to Market Definition Control Merger Litigation, the Case of US v. H&R Block, (Oct. 24,
2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2225395 (observ-
ing that the minor changes to the recent Merger Guidelines introduce an analytical
approach to defining markets that would significantly expand the potential for merger
enforcement).
152 Barry C. Harris & Joseph J. Simons, Focusing Market Definition: How Much Substitution
Is Necessary?, in 12 RESEARCH IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 207, 211 (Richard O. Zerbe, Jr. ed.,
1989).
153 Simons & Coate, supra note 151, at 5.
154 See, e.g., Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Antitrust Evaluation of Horizontal Mergers: An
Economic Alternative to Market Definition, 10 B.E. J. THEORETICAL ECON., no. 1, 2010, at 12
(discussing the calculation of upward pricing pressure); Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro,
Upward Pricing Pressure and Critical Loss Analysis: Response, CPI ANTITRUST J., Feb. 2010, at 6,
available at https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/assets/Free/Shapiro-Farrell
FEB10.pdf (arguing that average incremental cost is the appropriate measure for upward
pricing pressure).
155 See United States v. H&R Block, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 2d 36 (D.D.C. 2011).
156 See Jay Ezrielev & Janusz A. Ordover, The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: A Static
Compass in a Dynamic World?, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Oct. 2010, at 2; Simons & Coate, supra
note 151.
157 Simons & Coate, supra note 151, at 11 (footnote omitted).
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sellers of differentiated goods price well above marginal cost, the introduc-
tion of a margin-based analysis would lead to a baseline presumption that a
large number of mergers in the modern economy will create market power
or facilitate its exercise.
It remains to be seen whether courts will embrace the agencies’ new
approach.  Notwithstanding that neither operating nor direct margins have
received broad judicial or economic acceptance as market power indicators,
the impulse to rely on firm profitability to infer market power retains some
irresistible allure.
C. Price Discrimination and Control over Prices
Two other putative criteria of direct proof of market power—the exis-
tence of price discrimination and control over prices—can be lumped
together and disposed of quickly.  First, some courts158 and commentators159
have suggested that the presence of price discrimination provides direct evi-
dence of market power.  This claim is predicated on the textbook definition
of market power as pricing above marginal cost and the assumption that,
under perfect competition, sellers are incapable of engaging in price discrim-
ination.160  It is thus of a kind with reliance on the Lerner Index to infer
market power from supramarginal cost pricing.  Both methods measure mar-
ket power as a deviation from theoretical perfect competition rather than a
realistic competitive counterfactual.
The presence of price discrimination has little, if any, probative value as
evidence of market power.  Price discrimination is ubiquitous and only
weakly correlated, if at all, with the presence of market power.  It is now well
established in the economic literature that price discrimination is possible
and common under competitive conditions.161  Indeed, it is often the pres-
ence of competition that forces firms to engage in discriminatory pricing.162
Even if the social welfare consequences of imperfect price discrimination are
ambiguous and highly contingent upon assumed demand characteristics,163
158 See supra text accompanying notes 80–84.
159 See 2A PHILLIP E. AREEDAET AL., ANTITRUST LAW ¶ 522, at 125 (1995) (noting that
price discrimination “can usefully show the existence and degree of market power if cost
differences (or their absence) are readily determinable”); Pitofsky, supra note 42, at 1844
(stating that profit levels and price discrimination are essential to “a fair appraisal of mar-
ket power”).
160 Benjamin Klein & John Shepard Wiley Jr., Competitive Price Discrimination as an Anti-
trust Justification for Intellectual Property Refusals to Deal, 70 ANTITRUST L.J. 599, 625 (2003).
161 Mark Armstrong & John Vickers, Competitive Price Discrimination, 32 RAND J. ECON.
579, 580–82 (2001); Klein & Wiley, supra note 160, at 608–11; Michael E. Levine, Price
Discrimination Without Market Power, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 6 (2002).
162 WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, REGULATION MISLED BY MISREAD THEORY 2–3 (2006); see also
Elhauge, supra note 137, at 686–87 (arguing that in competitive markets incumbent air-
lines maximize their ability to incur joint and common costs by allocating a large share of
costs to high-demand buyers).
163 See, e.g., Richard Schmalensee, Output and Welfare Implications of Monopolistic Third-
Degree Price Discrimination, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 242, 246 (1981) (noting that some price dis-
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the presence of price discrimination is not a useful marker for the presence
of market power.
Control over prices fares no better.  The idea here is to locate market
power whenever a seller sets its price and output levels independently of the
pricing and output decisions of other firms.  It is true that in a textbook
sense, market power may be defined as control over prices,164 but that defini-
tion has to be relative to some undefined competitive ideal.  Every seller of a
heterogeneous product faces a downward sloping demand curve and there-
fore has a degree of pricing discretion.165  Competition between differenti-
ated sellers—on price, innovation, quality, and variety—may be vibrant, even
though each firm is less immediately reactive to its rivals’ price and output
changes than firms in homogeneous markets.166  To find market power sim-
ply because a seller is not a price taker would impose a fantastical construct
on antitrust enforcement in differentiated goods markets.
The alternative would be to associate pricing discretion with market
power only when it exceeded some level—but what level?  The temptation
would be to disassociate pricing discretion and market power so long as the
prices were not significantly above cost.  But then the analysis comes back full
circle to all of the infirmities with the profit margin-oriented analysis dis-
cussed previously.
Another peculiarity with associating pricing discretion with market
power is that homogeneous pricing in differentiated goods markets raises
antitrust concerns over collusion, or at least conscious parallelism.167  It is
precisely because firms have pricing discretion over differentiated goods that
suspicions are raised when sellers price such goods in lockstep.  It would be
an odd antitrust policy that suspected sellers of collusion when their prices
were homogeneous and insisted they had unilateral market power whenever
their prices appeared heterogeneous.
D. Pricing Discontinuity
One seemingly obvious way to establish the presence of market power is
through evidence of a sudden change in the firm’s pricing or output behav-
ior following the allegedly anticompetitive act.  For example, if a firm
engages in the proverbial, exclusionary act of blowing up its competitor’s
crimination can improve social welfare by making it profitable to sell to otherwise unprofit-
able markets); Marius Schwartz, Third-Degree Price Discrimination and Output: Generalizing a
Welfare Result, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 1259, 1259 (1990) (noting that welfare results from price
discrimination depend on certain assumptions of demand characteristics); Hal R.
Varian, Price Discrimination and Social Welfare, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 870, 875 (1985) (noting
that an increase in output is a prerequisite to an increase in welfare).
164 United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956) (“Monop-
oly power is the power to control prices or exclude competition.”).
165 JOAN ROBINSON, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION 92–94 (1938).
166 Herbert Hovenkamp, Mergers with Dominant Firms: The Lundbeck Case, CPI ANTI-
TRUST CHRON., Dec. 2011, at 5.
167 HOVENKAMP, supra note 33, § 4.6c, at 182–85.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\90-1\NDL102.txt unknown Seq: 32  8-DEC-14 14:32
62 notre dame law review [vol. 90:1
factory and then immediately raises its prices by fifty percent, there would
seem to be clear proof of deviation from the competitive counterfactual occa-
sioned by an anticompetitive act.  In this spirit, the Horizontal Merger Guide-
lines recognize that “[e]vidence of observed post-merger price increases or
other changes adverse to consumers is given substantial weight” as direct evi-
dence of anticompetitive effects.168  This approach has also been invoked in
non-merger contexts.  In successfully challenging Unocal’s alleged
defrauding of the California Air Resources Board (CARB) as monopolistic,
the FTC argued that market power could be directly inferred from the delta
between the zero royalty rate that Unocal represented would be charged
before the deception and the high royalty rates it charged after the
deception.169
While price discontinuity data could sometimes be useful as direct evi-
dence of market power acquired from anticompetitive conduct, this tool is
likely to be useful in only a small number of cases.  For it to be useful, there
need to be two clearly delineated time periods separated by a line of sharp
discontinuity and the absence of other likely causal factors.  This is not a
pattern observed in most antitrust cases.
Mergers would be most likely to generate such a pattern, and in the days
before the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act’s pre-merger notification regime, merger
cases were often contested based on a comparison of prices before and after
the merger.170  But because of Hart-Scott, the vast majority of merger cases
are decided before the merger has been consummated and therefore before
anticompetitive effects from the merger would appear.171  Further, merging
parties aware that the agencies and courts will use pricing discontinuity to
determine anticompetitive effects have an incentive to muddy the waters by
forgoing monopoly profits for some period following a merger and only rais-
ing their prices later in time when supervening events have made it difficult
to prove that the merger was to blame.
In non-merger cases, pricing discontinuity is even more complicated
analytically and as a matter of proof.  Here, it is necessary to draw some dis-
tinctions between upward discontinuity and downward discontinuity.  In the
merger context, only upward pricing discontinuity is relevant since the ques-
tion is whether the merger enabled the merging parties to exercise a new
degree of market power.172  By contrast, in monopolization and rule of rea-
168 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 2, at § 2.1.1, at 3.
169 Complaint Counsel’s Proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order
¶ 2874, In re Union Oil Co. of Cal., No. 9305 (F.T.C. Mar. 9, 2005), 2005 WL 906396,
available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/adjpro/d9305/050309ccfofvol4.pdf (“[D]irect evidence
of monopoly power can be measured by comparing the actual royalty rates to a competitive
benchmark.  The proper competitive benchmark is the royalty-free representation that
Unocal made to CARB.  Since Unocal is seeking royalties significantly above that level, and
has received or is likely to receive these royalties, Unocal has monopoly power.  Supra-
competitive royalty prices are direct evidence of Unocal’s monopoly power.”).
170 See Crane, supra note 19, at 52–53.
171 Id.
172 See supra text accompanying notes 153–54.
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son cases, there is also the possibility that incumbent firms maintained previ-
ously lawful market power through anticompetitive acts.173  In such a case,
the pricing discontinuity would be downward but for the anticompetitive act.
But, if the anticompetitive act was successful, then no pricing change will be
observed.  Hence, in a broad category of monopoly maintenance and rule of
reason cases, the absence of downward pricing discontinuity is the unlawful
market power—something that often cannot be directly observed.
Even when it can be directly observed—as when an incumbent succeeds
in delaying entry for a period of time, the entrant finally enters, and prices
fall—there are analytic risks in equating upside and downside effects as
though they were symmetrical.  When a market has been functioning com-
petitively and a firm or group of firms suddenly acquires market power and
raises its prices, the probability of a competitive counterfactual is plausible.
The converse is less likely to be true.  Sudden price decreases in a market
following new entry are less suggestive of a competitive counterfactual in the
previous era because the markets may have been previously unsuitable to
competition at the subsequent level.
For example, in the pharmaceutical industry, the first generic producer
to enter the market generally sets its price at seventy to eighty percent of the
branded price, with each successive generic entrant driving down the price of
generics by about ten percent until prices level off near marginal cost.174  To
infer market power in the branded firm and early generics from this abrupt
pricing discontinuity would be to conclude that market power of the kind
that antitrust law should police is inherent in the early stages of virtually all
pharmaceutical products.  What is objectionable about this possibility is not
merely its vast scope, but its failure to align antitrust policy with its normative
foundations in the competitive counterfactual.  If pioneer drug companies
were forced to price at marginal cost immediately upon introducing new
drugs, they could never recoup their fixed R&D costs and hence would have
no incentives to invest in R&D in the first place.175  In most cases, the drugs
on which generics offer radically lower prices would not exist if the generics
were able to enter very early in the drug’s commercial cycle.  This is not to say
173 See, e.g., United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 80–81 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (dis-
cussing monopoly maintenance theory).
174 See Richard E. Caves et al., Patent Expiration, Entry, and Competition in the U.S. Pharma-
ceutical Industry, in BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY: MICROECONOMICS 1, 35–36,
44–45 (Martin Neil Baily & Clifford Winston eds., 1991) (explaining that “with a single
generic entrant, the generic price is roughly 60 percent of the branded drug price” and
that “the entry of additional generic producers depresses the prices of existing generic
producers much more severely than the price of the original innovator”). See generally
David Reiffen & Michael R. Ward, Generic Drug Industry Dynamics, 87 REV. ECON. & STAT. 37
(2005).  Conversely, the price of the branded drug often increases slightly upon generic
entry as the branded firm prices to the less elastic demand of patients who strongly prefer
the brand over the generic.  Darius Lakdawalla & Tomas Philipson, Does Intellectual Property
Restrict Output? An Analysis of Pharmaceutical Markets, 55 J.L. & ECON. 151, 168 (2012).
175 See In re Remeron Direct Purchaser Antitrust Litig., 367 F. Supp. 2d 675, 682 (D.N.J.
2005).
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that exclusionary or collusive acts by branded firms that delay entry by gener-
ics are incapable of thwarting a competitive counterfactual.  But the mere
observation of a sharp price increase upon generic entry does not in itself
demonstrate the existence of a competitive counterfactual.  This point could
be extended to any market in which first movers sink considerable costs into
the creation of technologies with public good features—easy appropriability
at low cost by subsequent entrants.176
Two more significant limitations on proof of market power through pric-
ing discontinuity warrant mention.  First, as noted earlier, pricing discontinu-
ity is most powerful as proof of market power when it is sharp.  But relatively
few monopolization or rule of reason cases are about temporally concen-
trated anticompetitive acts that produce clear before and after pictures.
More typically, plaintiffs allege a course of conduct that diminished the mar-
ket’s competitiveness over time.  In such cases, pricing trends rather than
sharp discontinuities will appear.  While pricing trends could theoretically
still support an inference of market power, the storyline becomes far more
circumstantial and inconclusive as the discontinuity becomes progressive.177
Second, even when the discontinuity is sharp, one has to avoid easy con-
fusion of causation and correlation.  An event challenged as anticompetitive
may create an exogenous shock to the market resulting in a dramatically dif-
ferent pricing structure than previously without there being a plausible com-
petitive counterfactual.  Two cases in which this was possibly true are
considered in Sections III.C and D.  The mere fact of a sudden shock to the
market resulting in higher prices does not demonstrate the acquisition of
market power in the sense relevant to antitrust unless it involves conduct that
weakens the competitive process and deprives society of a but-for state of
affairs in which competition would have generated an improved state of
affairs.
E. Inferring Market Power from Exclusionary Conduct
Some courts have held that market power can be proven directly by “the
exclusion of competition.”178  This criterion is singularly confusing and mis-
leading.  As a doctrinal matter, proving market power through exclusionary
conduct contravenes a line of cases holding that exclusionary conduct that
does not distort the overall competitiveness of the market is not actionable
under the antitrust laws.179  The frequently repeated maxim that antitrust
176 ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 672–76 (4th ed.
1998).
177 See generally Michael A. Carrier, A Tort-Based Causation Framework for Antitrust Analy-
sis, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 991 (2011) (discussing causation in the context of antitrust analysis).
178 See, e.g., Tops Mkts., Inc. v. Quality Mkts., Inc., 142 F.3d 90, 97–98 (2d Cir. 1998)
(observing that excluding competition is one way courts have inferred market power); see
supra text accompanying note 82 for further citations.
179 NYNEX Corp. v. Discon, Inc., 525 U.S. 128, 137 (1998) (explaining that even mali-
cious business torts against competitors do not translate into antitrust violations absent
proof of a reduction of the competitiveness of the market); Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown &
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law protects “competition, not competitors”180 would make little sense if market
power could be established simply by the exclusion of competitors.  It would
amount to the inescapable circularity that a plaintiff cannot recover for
exclusionary acts unless she establishes that the acts create market power, but
that market power can be inferred from the commission of exclusionary acts.
More fundamentally, the proposition that market power can be inferred
from the exclusion of competition rests on one of three possible premises,
none of which is sufficient to justify the proposition.  First, the maxim might
be justified on a view that firms would only seek to exclude rivals if they could
obtain economic rents as a result.  That view is erroneous since firms may
have many reasons for seeking to exclude rivals without any expectation of
obtaining market power or monopoly profits.  A firm might seek to exclude a
rival in order to expand its own market share or sales at competitive
prices.181  A diversified firm selling to a variety of customers with differenti-
ated demand functions might try to exclude a rival from “skimming the
cream” by selling to just the least demand-elastic customers and thus dis-
rupting an efficient and competitive cost-allocation scheme.182  Firms might
try to exclude rivals from certain market positions to prevent them from
appropriating trade secrets, again without any expectation of being able to
charge supracompetitive prices.  And then there are the firms alternately
described as motivated by “personal pique”183 or “pure malice”184 who attack
rivals just for the hell of it.  In short, even firms without market power or
hope of obtaining it engage in many species of conduct that could be charac-
terized as “exclusionary.”
Second, it might be thought that the exclusion of competition is a
marker for market power since only firms with market power are capable of
excluding competitors.  But that is also untrue.  Many exclusionary acts
require no market power at all.  A street hotdog vendor who pushes a rival’s
cart into the path of an oncoming taxi has excluded a rival (and a taxi inci-
dentally), even though the vendor remains a perfect price taker.
This is not to deny the existence of what Thomas Krattenmaker, Robert
Lande, and Steven Salop have called “Bainian market power,” or the power
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 225 (1993) (“Even an act of pure malice by one
business competitor against another does not, without more, state a claim under the fed-
eral antitrust laws.”).
180 That maxim originated in Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962),
and has been repeated in Supreme Court and lower court decisions many times since.
181 See, e.g., Christopher R. Leslie, Cutting Through Tying Theory with Occam’s Razor: A
Simple Explanation of Tying Arrangements, 78 TUL. L. REV. 727 (2004) (explaining how tying
arrangements can be used to lock in sales in multiple markets without impairing overall
market competitiveness).
182 See generally Elhauge, supra note 137, at 734–43 (discussing the incentives of market
entrants to focus on sales to high-demand buyers and circumstances where this activity is
most likely to occur).
183 NYNEX, 525 U.S. at 137.
184 Brooke Grp., 509 U.S. at 225.
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to change a market’s structure by raising rivals’ costs.185  Krattenmaker et al.
model Bainian power as the ability to increase the rivals’ production costs in
order to make rivals’ products less competitive with the sellers’ products.186
Bainian power requires an outward shift in a rival’s cost curve in way that
reduces the demand elasticity facing the seller and hence enables it to
expand its market share and increase its price.187  Merely observing the
exclusion of rivals without these other effects would not show Bainian power.
But showing a price increase attendant to an anticompetitive act raises the
analytical difficulties discussed in Section II.C.  And if one can show that an
exclusionary act facilitates a price increase, one does not need to rely on the
exclusionary act to infer market power since the price increase itself does
that work.
Finally, one might justify “exclusion of competition” as a means of
directly proving market power by clarifying that the exclusion of rivals would
not qualify unless it could be shown that competition as a whole was
impaired, in the sense that the defendant obtained the power to increase
price above competitive levels or reduce output.  But at that point the “exclu-
sion of competition” criterion expands to “obtains market power through the
exclusion of competitors,” which does nothing to advance the analysis since it
assumes some extrinsic proof of market power.  In short, evidence that a firm
took measures to exclude rivals does not show that the firm has market
power.
F. Diversion Ratios
One of the chief innovations in the 2010 Merger Guidelines is the recog-
nition that whether a firm obtains market power from a merger may be a
function of the competitive proximity between the merging firms.  The con-
ventional approach in merger cases was to ask whether two firms were in the
same relevant market and then treat all firms within the market as equally
proximate competitors.  The revised Guidelines recognize that, at least in
differentiated goods markets, the extent to which customers view the prod-
ucts sold by the merging firms as each other’s best substitute may be more
indicative of market power.  Hence, the Guidelines require examination of
the diversion ratio—“the fraction of unit sales lost by the first product due to
an increase in its price that would be diverted to the second product”188—of
the merging firms.
To illustrate, suppose that conventional market definition would render
a market of “German luxury automobiles,” which includes Mercedes-Benz,
Audi, BMW, and Porsche.  In conventional terms, market power would be a
185 Krattenmaker et al., supra note 27, at 249–50; see Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven
C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising Rivals’ Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J.
209 (1986) (discussing firms’ ability to gain pricing power by raising rivals’ costs).
186 Krattenmaker et al., supra note 27, at 249–50.
187 See id.
188 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 2, § 6.1, at 21.
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function of the market shares of each of the firms and structural factors such
as entry barriers.  Under the 2010 Guidelines, the important question would
not be the market power of any of these firms in the abstract, but the diver-
sion ratio between the two merging firms.  If a majority of customers who
bought Audis would have bought a BMW as their second choice, an Audi-
BMW merger might raise greater concerns than a BMW-Mercedes merger,
on the theory that a combined Audi-BMW would face customers with less
elastic demand.
The diversion ratio approach marks an improvement in market power
identification insofar as it understands market power as relative to a particu-
lar act rather than as an abstract condition attending to a firm.  The question
is this particular merger, not the power of each firm as a general matter.  This
analysis could be extended with qualifications to non-merger contexts,
including both horizontal agreement and exclusion cases.  In exclusion
cases, the question would shift from whether the defendant enjoyed market
power in the abstract to whether the exclusion of the victim firm would
enhance the defendant’s power to increase price or reduce output.  Evidence
that customers considered the victim and predator each other’s best substi-
tutes would support such an inference whereas contrary evidence would
weaken it.  Similarly, in horizontal agreement cases, the analysis would focus
on the diversion ratios between the parties to the agreement—an analysis
that would become considerably more complicated once there were more
than two or three parties to the agreement.
Diversion ratios provide a useful data point in considering questions of
market power from identified anticompetitive acts, but cannot, by them-
selves, answer market power questions.  Merely knowing that two firms are
each other’s closest substitutes does not show that the cessation of competi-
tion between the firms—whether by merger, anticompetitive agreement, or
exclusion—would provide one or more of the firms sufficient power to raise
prices or reduce output, since customers might still be willing to substitute to
other suppliers in the event of price increases by the merging or colluding
firms.  Ruling out the possibility of second-order customer substitution
requires measuring cross-elasticity as to all plausible substitutes, which
nudges the analysis back into relevant market definition—which direct analy-
sis was supposed to avoid.  Diversion ratio analysis is thus primarily useful in
combination with other techniques or sources of evidence, but will rarely
supply an answer standing alone.
G. Competitive Benchmarks
A final possible way to measure market power directly—or, at least not
through market definition and market shares—is by comparison between the
industrial sector under consideration and a competitive benchmark.189  For
example, if one were asking whether the dominant U.S. widget supplier had
189 See Jerry A. Hausman & J. Gregory Sidak, Evaluating Market Power Using Competitive
Benchmark Prices Instead of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, 74 ANTITRUST L.J. 387, 388 (2007).
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market power, one might compare various data points—i.e., price, quality,
and innovation—about U.S. widget production to an extrinsic benchmark,
say gadgets.  Or the benchmark could be the same product in a different
geographic region.  For example, in its successful lawsuit against Visa and
MasterCard’s exclusionary rules prohibiting member banks from issuing
competitors’ cards, the Justice Department argued that in foreign countries
without the exclusionary rule, Visa was pushed into a higher rate of innova-
tion than in the United States.190
The appeal of the competitive benchmark approach lies in its realism
and empirical grounding.  In a case with a competitive benchmark, the com-
petitive counterfactual is not some idealized market operating under condi-
tions of perfect competition but rather a real market that, along various
vectors, outperforms the market under consideration.  Competitive
benchmarking thus has the virtue of focusing market power analysis on fac-
tual comparisons rather than theoretical constructs.
For all its facial appeal, the competitive benchmark approach has serious
drawbacks.  First, there is no generally accepted way of indexing comparative
competitiveness at a firm-specific level.  Firm or sectoral competitiveness is a
function of several different factors, including at least price, quality, and
innovation.  In order to compare two markets, all factors would need to be
weighted unless all factors turned out to be superior in the benchmark mar-
ket.  To revert to the credit card example, suppose that Visa showed greater
innovation but also charged more for use of its network in Europe than in
the United States.  Europe could not function as a competitive benchmark
for establishing market power in the United States unless weights were
assigned to the innovation and price factors, a task that could not be accom-
plished with anything approaching analytical precision.191
A second drawback concerns problems with drawing an inference of
market power from competitive superiority.  Even adjusted for all of the
many cost, regulatory, and demand-side factors that might skew performance
across markets, competitive superiority may reflect managerial superiority
rather than market power.  A firm with comparatively low quality and innova-
tion may be operating at its maximum potential given its management.  Over
time, poorly managed firms with vigilant shareholders operating under cor-
porate law rules that do not overly entrench managers should see improved
performance, but it would be unrealistic to assume that competitively
underperforming firms are monopolistic and not just ill-managed.
Finally, there are risks with using intra-firm competitive benchmarks.  In
particular, inferring market power from a comparison of a firm’s pricing
across different markets runs a high risk of type two errors.  A firm’s differen-
tial pricing across markets often reflects competitively compelled price dis-
crimination.192  Pharmaceutical companies that price discriminate across
190 United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 241 (2d Cir. 2003).
191 See Ian Ayres & Gideon Parchomovsky, Tradable Patent Rights, 60 STAN. L. REV. 863,
867 (2007) (noting the tradeoffs between pricing and innovation).
192 See supra text accompanying notes 189–91.
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geographic markets may face the same competitors in every market and earn
no more than an ordinary rate of return on capital in the aggregate.193
Establishing market power from a competitive benchmark requires ruling
out the many other factors that can cause stark pricing differences between
markets—a task that may often prove impossible to perform.
H. Summation
The analysis just presented suggests that the direct evidence of the mar-
ket power toolkit is depleted.  Pricing margins, price discrimination, control
over prices, and exclusion of competition are unworkable as criteria and
should be discarded.  Entry barrier analysis needs to be reformulated, and is
questionable as an analytical tool without an understanding of the contours
of the market the barriers are protecting from competition—an item of
proof that steers the analysis back toward the market definition paradigm.
Pricing discontinuity, diversion ratios, and competitive benchmarking may
provide useful information under some circumstances but will often require
corroboration from other tools to provide a sufficiently robust answer.  And
often, they will not apply at all.
For all of its analytical weaknesses, the market definition/market share
paradigm suggested an organized progression of analysis.  At present, direct
analysis cannot promise anything but an inductive, ad hoc inquiry.  A court
or agency first has to scour the ground for facts—were there sharp price
increases, is there another market that could serve as a benchmark, etc.—
and then see whether those facts can be backed into a theory of competitive
harm.  If facts and correlated theories do not present themselves, courts and
agencies have no choice but to fall back on structuralist proof, with all of its
infirmities.
The upshot is that antitrust analysis is not ready to give up on market
definition and market shares.  While direct evidence ascends, it will continue
to play in the shadow of the conventional approach, offering complementary
insights and filling in gaps in some cases.  Or, if it stays on its present course,
it may obfuscate the analysis more often than not.
Lest this assessment sound overly pessimistic, the final Part of this Article
offers four case studies in which a focus on the competitive counterfactual as
the meaning of market power, an enhanced understanding of the entry bar-
rier curve, and others tools of direct measurement could improve antitrust
analysis.  Clearing the brush from the current understanding of market
power and direct evidence provides immediate analytical benefits.  In the
long run, it sets the stage for a comprehensive reconstruction of the concept
of market power.
193 See William W. Fisher III, When Should We Permit Differential Pricing of Information?, 55
UCLA L. REV. 1, 8–9 (2007) (discussing geographic price discrimination of patented AIDS
drugs).
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III. ILLUSTRATIVE CASES
A. Operating Systems
One of the hotly contested issues in the Justice Department’s monopoli-
zation lawsuit against Microsoft was whether Microsoft enjoyed monopoly
power in PC-compatible computer operating systems.194  The D.C. Circuit
concluded that it did, primarily on an indirect market definition/market
share analysis.195  The court also considered a “direct” approach to market
power, which mainly consisted of rebutting Microsoft’s claims that its heavy
research and development investments and perpetual innovation dispelled
any inference of market power.196
One of the central tensions on market power in Microsoft was whether
there were high barriers to entry into the operating systems market.  The
government initially, and ultimately the court, faced a dilemma concerning
proof and emphasis.  The primary entry barriers at issue were indirect net-
work effects caused by feedback loops between programmers and users.197
Computer users strongly prefer to purchase operating systems that are rich in
available programs.  Computer programmers prefer to write applications for
operating systems that are rich with users.  Hence, potential new entrants
into the operating systems market face a severe “chicken and egg” problem
in trying to steal share from the incumbent.  Users will not buy an operating
system until it is program rich, and programmers will not write for an operat-
ing system until it is customer rich.198
This network effects theory was central to the government’s case,199 but
it also posed a deep conceptual problem.  Throughout the litigation the gov-
ernment repeatedly emphasized that entry barriers—a combination of the
previously described network effects and scale economies—were extremely
high.200  But this fed into the arguments of skeptics to the effect that entry
barriers were so high that operating systems were something akin to a natural
194 United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 47 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
195 Id. at 55–56.
196 Id. at 56–58.
197 Id. at 55.
198 Id.
199 See A. Douglas Melamed & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, U.S. v. Microsoft: Lessons Learned
and Issues Raised, in ANTITRUST STORIES 287, 303 (Eleanor M. Fox & Daniel A. Crane eds.,
2007).
200 Complaint ¶ 58, United States v. Microsoft Corp., 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2001)
(No. 98-1232), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f1700/1763.htm (noting that
economies of scale and network effects result in high barriers to entry); Declaration of
Franklin M. Fisher at 5, Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (No. 98-1232), available at http://www
.justice.gov/atr/cases/f212700/212766.pdf (“[N]etwork effects create high barriers to
competition and entry in operating systems.  This increases the risk that anti-competitive
conduct by Microsoft will increase barriers even further.”); Declaration of David S. Sibley
¶¶ 7–18, Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d 30 (No. 98-1232), available at http://www.justice.gov/
atr/cases/f212700/212767.pdf (arguing that scale economies and network effects created
high barriers to entry).
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monopoly in which a single firm would always enjoy dominance.201  If so,
then the likelihood of a competitive counterfactual actually would be low,
since Microsoft would have little incentive to engage in exclusionary conduct
and the likelihood that a competitor would overtake it was similarly low.
Thus, the government’s continued insistence on the height of entry barriers
had the counter effect of bolstering arguments that the operating system
market was Schumpeterian and therefore naturally dominated by a single
firm.202  Responses to these sorts of arguments had the effect of talking down
the importance of scale economies and network effects, which diluted the
government’s claim that Microsoft enjoyed monopoly power.203  The D.C.
Circuit acknowledged these tensions but largely avoided resolving them, not-
ing the indeterminacy in the academic literature over whether operating sys-
tems were strongly Schumpeterian and that Microsoft itself made no
argument that anticompetitive conduct should be assessed differently in tech-
nologically dynamic markets.204
The tentativeness of the court’s resolution reflects the conceptual flaw in
conventional market power discussed in Section II.A—the standard assump-
tion that proof of high entry barriers is necessary to establish an antitrust
violation.  Recognizing the concavity of the entry barrier curve makes the
case that Microsoft possessed market power in PC-compatible operating sys-
tems more straightforward.  Arguably, the entry barriers in operating systems
circa the year 2000 were of middling height.  Scale economies and network
effects were such that relatively few firms could hope to compete with
Microsoft as platforms for application programming interfaces (APIs).205
Further, potential rivals probably did not have the luxury of entering the
market on a trial or niche basis but would need to enter suddenly at a large
scale in order to “tip” a sufficient number of programmers and customers to
their platform in a short period of time.206  These facts represented entry
barriers that could be surmounted by only a small number of firms.  But,
again arguably, they could and would have been surmounted by firms like
Netscape, Sun, and Novell absent exclusionary conduct.  Microsoft thus occu-
pied exactly the position where exclusionary conduct and a competitive
201 See David Balto & Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust and High-Tech Industries: The New Chal-
lenge, 43 ANTITRUST BULL. 583, 604 (1998) (“In industries characterized by networks, even
monopoly is seen by some observers as inevitable and merely an accommodation to con-
sumer demand for a compatible technical standard.”); Harry First, Microsoft and the Evolu-
tion of the Intellectual Property Concept, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 1369, 1412–13 (exploring natural
monopoly arguments in context of the Microsoft case); Alan J. Meese, Intrabrand Restraints
and the Theory of the Firm, 83 N.C. L. REV. 5, 82–83 (2004) (same).
202 See Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 49–50 (discussing arguments that the computer systems
operating market was a natural monopoly).
203 For a skeptical take on the strength of network effects, see WILLIAM H. PAGE & JOHN
E. LOPATKA, THE MICROSOFT CASE 86–96 (2007).
204 Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 50.
205 See supra text accompanying notes 194–98.
206 See Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations, 90
CALIF. L. REV. 1889, 1896–97 (2002) (discussing the tipping phenomenon).
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counterfactual are most plausible—a presently dominant position in a mar-
ket with entry barriers surmountable by a confined number of potential rivals
absent the creation of artificial entry barriers.
My point here is not to pass judgment on whether Microsoft in fact had
market power or engaged in exclusionary conduct.  Rather, it is to show that
the analysis would be improved by a recognition that entry barriers are most
strongly correlated with a competitive counterfactual when they narrow the
number of potential entrants but, as to those entrants, do not seriously
impede entry.  This understanding of the market power relevant to antitrust
cases would sharpen legal analysis and align it more closely with antitrust’s
normative foundations in the competitive counterfactual.
B. Search Engines
As Microsoft has faded as antitrust’s tech beˆte noire, Google has
assumed its position, although thus far without the sorts of negative conse-
quences that plagued Microsoft in the late twentieth century and early
twenty-first.207  The threshold issue for any monopolization or abuse of domi-
nance claims is whether Google has market power in Internet search or
related services, such as advertising for Internet search or, more broadly,
Internet advertising.  The FTC has largely examined the issue in the tradi-
tional structuralist vein, defining a relevant market in search advertising and
finding Google dominant because of its large market share.208  Google critics
claim that Internet search is characterized by strong indirect network effects,
since search engines determine relevance based on the search and website
visitation patterns of other users.209  Google and its allies respond that
Google is incapable of monopolizing Internet search since “competition is
one click away.”210
207 The FTC conducted a broad investigation of Google and closed it after Google
made relatively minor concessions.  Edward Wyatt, U.S. Ends Inquiry on Web Search; Google Is
Victor, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2013, at A1.  The European Commission is continuing its investi-
gation of Google. Id.
208 See Statement of Federal Trade Commission Concerning Google/DoubleClick, FED. TRADE
COMM’N, FTC File No. 071-0170, available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/caselist/0710170/0712
20statement.pdf.
209 See Peter T. Barbur et al., Market Definition in Complex Internet Markets, 12 SEDONA
CONF. J. 285, 290 (2011) (noting that Google provides free search engine use because of
indirect network effects); Pamela Jones Harbour  & Tara Isa Koslov, Section 2 in a Web 2.0
World: An Expanded Vision of Relevant Product Markets, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 769, 777–78 (2010)
(observing that the accuracy and relevance of Google searches improve with continued
use); Jeffrey Jarosch, Novel “Neutrality” Claims Against Internet Platforms: A Reasonable Frame-
work for Initial Scrutiny, 59 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 537, 569 (2011) (discussing network effects and
improved search data); Viva R. Moffat, Regulating Search, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 475, 489
(2009) (discussing networks effects with search engines).
210 Facts About Google and Competition: Questions and Answers, GOOGLE, https://web.arch
ive.org/web/20120415050748/http://www.google.com/competition/qa.html (last visited
Apr. 15, 2012) (“Does Google have a monopoly in search?  No.  On the Internet, competi-
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Missing from the current debate over Google’s dominance is a realistic
appraisal of a competitive counterfactual.  Knowing that Google has market
power in a textbook sense does little to clarify the difficult policy questions
faced by courts and regulators.  The normatively important question is
whether Internet search could plausibly be structured significantly differently
than it currently is, with users moving fluidly across a number of search
engines with roughly comparable customer acceptance and utilization.
In answering this question, competitive benchmarking may be particu-
larly useful.  Since search engines are tailored to national boundaries,
Internet search in other countries provides a reference point for asking
whether a competitive counterfactual is plausible.  On a market share basis,
Google is dominant in twenty-one out of the world’s twenty-five largest econ-
omies,211 with a usage share ranging from a low of about 65% in the United
States to nearly 100% in many countries.212  But when Google is not domi-
nant in a market, another search engine invariably is.  In Russia, China, and
South Korea, an indigenous search engine (Yandex in Russia, Baidu in
China, and Naver in South Korea) dominates the market with shares in the
60 to 70% range.213  Yahoo dominates Japanese search with a share
approaching 60%.214  Google is present in all of these markets, but plays a
very distant second fiddle.  There are no instances in the top economies, and
few outside, of markets where a single search engine does not have a share
approaching 60%.
tion is one click away.  Users aren’t locked in to using Google search, and the cost of
switching to a different search engine is zero.”).
211 GDP (current US$), WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP
.MKTP.CD (last visited Oct. 29, 2014).
212 ANNE F. KENNEDY & KRISTJA´N MA´R HAUKSSON, GLOBAL SEARCH ENGINE MARKETING
app. C (2012), available at http://ptgmedia.pearsoncmg.com/images/9780789747884/
supplements/9780789747884_appC.pdf (last visited Oct. 29, 2014) (including the United
States (Google, 65.8%); Germany (Google, 97.09%); France (Google, 95.59%); Brazil
(Google, 97.44%); United Kingdom (Google, 92.77%); Italy (Google, 96.96%); India
(Google; 97.08%); Canada (Google, 92.93%); Spain (Google, 93.02%); Australia (Google,
95.55%); Mexico (Google, 93.35%); Indonesia (Google, 96.5%); Netherlands (Google,
94.65%); Turkey (Google, 98.97%); Switzerland (Google, 97.32%); Saudi Arabia (Google,
95.42%); Sweden (Google, 96.68%); Poland (Google, 98.05%); Belgium (Google,
97.61%); Norway (Google, 96.1%); Argentina (Google, 96.59%)).
213 See Jaewha Choi, Why Google Can’t Be #1 in the Korean Market, THE ONLINE ECONOMY:
STRATEGY AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP (Oct. 5, 2012), http://www.onlineeconomy.org/why-
google-can’t-be-1-in-the-korean-market (noting that Naver holds a 73% search engine mar-
ket share in South Korea); KENNEDY & HAUKSSON, supra note 212, at (showing Baidu with a
60.74% search engine market share); Search Engine Market Shares in Russia, GINZAMETRICS,
http://www.ginzametrics.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/05/search-market-share.png
(last updated Apr. 2012) (containing pie chart showing Yandex with a 59.6% search engine
market share).
214 Yahoo Japan to Use Google Search, BBC NEWS (July 27, 2010, 10:24 AM), http://www
.bbc.co.uk/news/business-10773532 (noting that Yahoo Japan holds about a 57% search
engine market share).
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It would be wrong to conclude from this that Internet search is a natural
monopoly, in the sense of a market where all or most sales are necessarily
made by a single firm.215  Alternative search engines may be able to flourish
by catering to niche preferences or otherwise playing in the market on a
relatively small scale.  But, at least given present technological and social
dynamics, Internet search exhibits a strong tendency toward selection of a
single dominant provider that tends to control a usage share in the 60 to 95%
range.  Viewed from this perspective, Google’s dominance in a large number
of markets may not reflect the kind of market power with which antitrust law
is concerned, because there is no likely counterfactual in which the market
looks more classically competitive.216
A related question is whether Google has the power to distort competi-
tion in Internet sites that provide services like shopping, maps, travel book-
ing, or social networking of various kinds by preferring Google affiliated sites
in its universal search results.217  The answer to this question turns on
whether Google is dominant in traffic referral to Internet sites.218  Even if
Google’s share of search engine usage is high, unless universal search is the
gateway to Internet sites, bias in universal search will not distort competition
in Internet services.  At present, the empirical evidence suggests that Google
is the referral source for a relatively small share of the total referrals that
Internet services such as news and travel booking receive.219  Users are find-
ing many paths—such as Facebook, linking from other sites, bookmarking,
apps, or typing in a URL—other than universal search to locate Internet ser-
vices.  This implies that Google lacks the power to distort competition in
Internet services.
Observe that the referral dominance question does not neatly fit into
established patterns of antitrust analysis.  Traditional market definition/mar-
ket share analysis would not be helpful, since the important question is not
whether Google has the power to price above competitive levels or reduce
output in universal search, but whether its position in universal search gives it
215 See Oren Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission? Access, Fairness, and
Accountability in the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1149, 1180–82 (2008) (arguing that
search engines exhibit natural monopoly characteristics).
216 Questions regarding search engine dominance have played out in other markets
where a firm other than Google is dominant.  In 2009, the Bejing No. 1 Intermediate
People’s Court dismissed a claim by the Tangshan Renren Information Service Center
(Renren) that Baidu had intentionally blocked Renren, a social networking site similar to
Facebook, from its search results.  Jiangxiao Athena Hou & Jane Yi, A Progress Report on the
Implementation of China’s Anti-Monopoly Law, COMPETITION: J. ANTITRUST & UNFAIR COMPETI-
TION L. SEC. ST. B. CAL., Spring 2011, at 79, 85–86.  The court found that Renren failed to
prove that Baidu held a dominant position in Internet search. Id. at 86.
217 See Daniel A. Crane, Search Neutrality as an Antitrust Principle, 19 GEO. MASON L. REV.
1199, 1200–03 (2012) (discussing processes of search origins and website referrals).
218 See Daniel A. Crane, Search Neutrality and Referral Dominance, 8 J. COMPETITION L. &
ECON. 459, 460 (2012) (discussing the many ways users access websites and how search
dominance may not be equivalent to referral dominance).
219 See id. at 464–65.
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the power to suppress competition in other kinds of Internet services—
including ones in which Google itself might not be dominant.  The relevant
focus is less on static power in any market than on the trajectory of user
migration across online locations.
C. e-Books
As discussed in Part II, evidence of sharp pricing discontinuity following
an event challenged as anticompetitive is an appealing candidate for direct
proof of market power because of its visceral force in demonstrating the com-
petitive counterfactual.  But while such evidence may be helpful when availa-
ble, it can sometimes trompe l’oeil—misleading more than it helps.  The
next two case studies, on e-books and pharmaceuticals, explore some difficul-
ties with inferring market power from pricing shocks or other sudden market
dislocations accompanying an event challenged as anticompetitive.
The Justice Department’s high-profile case against Apple220 and five
major book publishers221 concerning e-book pricing rests on seemingly obvi-
ous evidence of the exercise of collective market power creating anticompeti-
tive effects.  The government alleged, and the district court recently found,
that Apple colluded with the book publishers to force Amazon to switch from
the wholesale model, where Amazon set the price of e-books, typically at
$9.99, to an agency model, where the publisher sets the price of the books,
typically at $14.99, and the distributor retains a 30% commission.222  The
sudden and dramatic price increases following the challenged agreements
provide seemingly conclusive evidence that Apple and the publishers exer-
cised collective market power to increase e-book prices.223
But reaching that conclusion from the pricing discontinuity is problem-
atic insofar as it isolates price effects in e-books without regard to the broader
dynamics in inter-system and inter-platform competition taking place in the
industry at the same time.  In many technology and information markets,
competition may be more intense at a system or platform level than at the
level of individual platform accessories like books, songs, movies, software
programs, or apps.224  A significant change in systems competition, such as
with the introduction of a new system, can both increase the competitiveness
of the market as a whole and hence decrease the market power of the market
220 United States v. Apple Inc., 952 F. Supp. 2d 638 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
221 The five publishers were Hachette Book Group, Inc., HarperCollins Publishers
LLC, Holtzbrinck Publishers LLC d/b/a Macmillan, Penguin Group (USA), Inc., and
Simon & Schuster, Inc. Id. at 645.
222 Id. at 666–67, 691–94.
223 The case was tried against Apple alone after the publishers all settled with the gov-
ernment.  The district court found that Apple had orchestrated a series of per se illegal
horizontal agreements, and hence found it unnecessary to determine the market power
question.  Id. at 645, 691–94.
224 See William H. Page & Seldon J. Childers, Antitrust, Innovation, and Product Design in
Platform Markets: Microsoft and Intel, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 363, 375 (2012), available at http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1914737.
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participants even while exerting upward pricing pressure on particular acces-
sories, such as e-books.  A more competitive ecosystem may actually lead to
price increases in some of the ecosystem’s outputs.
This may well have been the case as to e-books.  Between the introduc-
tion of Amazon’s Kindle in 2007 and the introduction of Barnes & Noble’s
Nook in 2009 and Apple’s iPad in 2010, Amazon was the juggernaut in the e-
book and e-reader market.  Amazon strategically priced e-books at an attrac-
tive $9.99 in part to stimulate demand for the Kindle and, arguably, to
entrench its market position in advance of the availability of competitive
technologies.  Indeed, in the lead up to Apple’s launch of the iPad, Amazon
was pricing most of its e-books several dollars below the publisher’s wholesale
price, meaning that Amazon was losing several dollars on every sale in order
to subsidize the entrenchment of the Kindle.225
The book publishers felt that Amazon was devaluing the e-book market
in order to promote its proprietary systems and technology.  They feared that
Amazon’s low e-book pricing would condition consumers to expect low e-
book prices forever—that it would poison the well.226  But so long as Amazon
had a near-monopoly on e-book distribution, the publishers were unable to
prevent Amazon from using their content as a market share entrenching loss
leader.
The advent of the iPad (and to a lesser extent the Nook) in 2010 radi-
cally altered the electronic media distribution ecosystem.  The iPad leap-
frogged the Kindle’s limited e-reader functionality and created a new
general-purpose tablet market, including such additional features as 3G wire-
less, expanded memory, camera, GPS navigation, and vastly expanded apps.
Within a few months, the iPad had left the Kindle in the dust from a market
share and industry buzz perspective.
The iPad’s radical disruption of the e-reading ecosystem virtually guaran-
teed that e-book prices would rise, even though the surrounding ecosystem
had become vastly more competitive.  Once the iPad leapfrogged the Kindle,
the book publishers’ individual bargaining position vis-a`-vis Amazon
increased and Amazon had no further incentive to loss-lead on e-books in
order to sell the Amazon system (especially since they were portable to
iPads).  With or without collusion, e-book prices were bound to rise once the
iPad hit the market.
The district court found that Apple orchestrated a per se illegal price
fixing conspiracy, in which event the presence or absence of market power
would be irrelevant.227  But to the extent that the challenged agreements are
functionally vertical rather than horizontal and hence subject to full rule of
reason analysis, it would be analytically perilous to assume market power
from the sharp pricing discontinuity at the moment of the challenged agree-
ments.  The challenged agreement coincided with a major technological
225 See Apple, 952 F. Supp. 2d at 649.
226 See id.
227 See id. at 691–94.
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shock to the market, and hence deducing market power from the price
increases very likely confuses correlation with causation.
D. Pharmaceuticals
A second pricing discontinuity case, FTC v. Lundbeck, Inc.,228 reveals an
even more dramatic example of how inferences from sudden price effects are
sometimes misleadingly easy. At the time the FTC brought the case, there
were only two FDA-approved drug treatments for patent ductus arteriosus, a
life-threatening heart condition that primarily affects low-birth-weight and
usually premature babies.229  Lundbeck bought the rights to the first drug,
Indocin IV, from Merck in 2005 and the rights to the second drug,
NeoProfen, from Abbott Laboratories in 2006.  Two days after acquiring
NeoProfen, Lundbeck raised the price of Indocin by 1300%.230  At the time of its
acquisition of NeoProfen, that drug had not yet been introduced on the mar-
ket.  When Lundbeck introduced it a few months later, it priced NeoProfen
at about the same level as the post-increase price of Indocin.231
In eyebrow-raising decisions, the district court and the Eighth Circuit
rejected the FTC’s challenge to the acquisition on the grounds that the Com-
mission failed to prove that Indocin and NeoProfen belonged in the same
relevant market.232  The two drugs are not bioequivalent compounds, and
the district court credited the testimony of five clinical pharmacists and seven
neonatologists, who testified that the neonatologists selected a drug based
solely on its clinical advantages and did not take price into consideration.233
Since there was no cross-elasticity of demand between the two drugs, they did
not belong in the same relevant market and, without proof that the acquisi-
tions increased the concentration of any market, there was no antitrust
case.234
At one level, Lundbeck seems to be a poster child for the growing view
that market definition is an analytically incoherent formalism that snuffs out
compelling antitrust claims.235  Herbert Hovenkamp has persuasively argued
that the courts erroneously relied on an assumption of perfect competition
in which changes in the prices of competitive products instantly affect the
228 650 F.3d 1236 (8th Cir. 2011).




232 Id. at 1240–43.
233 Id. at 1240.
234 Id.
235 See David S. Evans & Michael Noel, Defining Antitrust Markets When Firms Operate Two-
Sided Platforms, 2005 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 667, 696–97 n.59 (“Formal market definition has
taken on a life of its own and this formalism attempts to impose sharp boundaries even
where they do not exist.  Particularly in differentiated products markets, mechanical mar-
ket definition risks weakening the analysis rather than strengthening it and there are risks
of misleading conclusions.”).
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demand for their substitutes.236  With differentiated products—like non-
bioequivalent drugs used to treat the same condition—competitive responses
may develop in more complex patterns over space and time.237
If the insistence on formal market definition based on analytical assump-
tions derived from a perfect competition model was erroneous, there
remains the question of whether the 1300% price increase constituted direct
evidence of market power.  At a visceral level, the evidence seems compel-
ling.  But there may be more to the case than meets the eye.
Ironically, the best impeachment of the likelihood of a competitive
counterfactual may come from a voice supporting an even more aggressive
stance than the one taken by the FTC.  In a concurring statement238 and
later law review article,239 Commissioner Rosch offered an alternative
account of the acquisitions and their effect on price.  Rosch would have chal-
lenged Lundbeck’s (then named Ovation) acquisition of Indocin even apart
from its subsequent acquisition of NeoProfen.  He reasoned that the Indocin
acquisition—which at that time was just a conglomerate acquisition—ena-
bled the price increase because of a change in the reputational considera-
tions of Merck, Indocin’s previous owner, and Lundbeck.240  Rosch
suspected that Merck, a large and diversified company with many different
drug portfolios, would have been reluctant to charge a monopoly price for a
drug used to treat premature babies.241  Lundbeck, a much smaller company
with a limited product portfolio, might not have such reputational con-
straints and hence might feel free to price the drugs ruthlessly.
If Rosch is right about what happened, this actually complicates rather
than helps the antitrust case because it throws doubt on the likelihood of a
competitive counterfactual.  If what kept prices down was Merck’s fear of
reputational sanctions from the health care community rather than fear of
being undercut in price by Abbott, the price effect did not result from a loss
of competition between the two acquired products.  The but-for scenario in
which prices remained lower would not be a competitive counterfactual since
competition would not be the force restraining the price increase.  The same
price increase might have occurred if NeoProfen and Indocin had been sold
to two separate venture capital funds without any concerns over future
reputational consequences or if the parent companies had simply spun off
the relevant units in order to maximize their profitability.
236 See Hovenkamp, supra note 166, at 5.
237 See id. at 3.
238 Concurring Statement of Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch: Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Ovation
Pharm. Inc., FED. TRADE COMM’N, FTC File No. 081-0156, (Dec. 2008), available at http://
www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2008/12/concurring-statement-commissioner-j-thomas-
rosch-federal-trade-commission [hereinafter Statement of Commissioner Rosch].
239 J. Thomas Rosch & Darren S. Tucker, Emerging Theories of Competitive Harm in Merger
Enforcement, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Oct. 2011, at 1.
240 See Statement of Commissioner Rosch, supra note 238, at 1.
241 Id.
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Lundbeck illustrates the difficulties with drawing strong inferences from
pricing discontinuities.  It serves as a reminder that many economic forces
other than competition between rivalrous firms steer the course of firm
behavior.  Since antitrust law is solely focused on competitive drivers of firm
behavior, direct analysis of market power must take care to separate competi-
tion and non-competition based influences.  And that may often prove
impossible.
CONCLUSION
As market definition fades, antitrust law sorely needs a redefinition of
market power that satisfies three criteria.  First, it should reflect the norma-
tive assumption of antitrust law—that firms should not intentionally diminish
the competitiveness of markets on grounds other than efficiency.  Second, it
should reflect a coherent relationship between the market power and
anticompetitive conduct elements.  Finally, it should be workable given the
institutional constraints of contemporary antitrust decisionmaking.  This is a
tall order, but an urgent requirement for modern antitrust.
At present, direct analysis does not nearly fit this bill.  Much of the prob-
lem is rooted in a deep-seeded disposition to think of market power as a
deviation from an idealized vision of perfect competition rather than as the
delta between a plausible competitive counterfactual and the actual market.
Correcting the starting premise requires jettisoning a good many of the tradi-
tional tools of direct analysis of market power.  And once that is accom-
plished, the direct analysis toolkit looks quite impoverished.
Given the ubiquity of the market power element in antitrust analysis, the
need for a systematic reconstruction of market power analysis is urgent.  This
Article has contributed to the preliminary stages of that process by seeking to
articulate first principles, diagnose sources of doctrinal confusion, jettison
existing approaches inconsistent with first principles, and scrutinize the vir-
tues and limitations of the remaining recognized methods.  Much more work
lies ahead.
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